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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses recent developments in the theory of op-
timal capital structure to demonstrate how the federal 
corpolflte income tax with an interest deduction, but 
without a corresponding dividend deduction, misallo-
cates capital within the corporate sector by encouraging 
investment in low-risk, low-growth projects employing 
tangible assets over high-risk, high-growth projects em-
ploying intangible assets. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
PROMETHEUS is fabled to have created man out of clay in the image of the gods and to have taught his mortal progeny the 
various ans and sciences. Mankind's resulting obsession with cre-
ating and building left little time for worshipping the gods. That 
angered a jealous Zeus, who responded by extinguishing all 
eanhly fires, causing much suffering on Eanh. Troubled by the 
plight of his mortal progeny, Prometheus stole fire from Mount 
Olympus and brought it back to Earth in a hollow fennel stalk. 
For his transgression, Prometheus was severely punished by 
Zeus, 
1 
who permitted mankind to keep fire and continue to prac-
tice the arts and sciences. 2 
For his gifts to the human race, Aeschylus treats Prometheus 
1. Zeus ordered Hermes to chain Prometheus to a rock on Mount Caucasus 
where a vulture fed daily on his liver, which grew back each night. HESIOD, THE 
HoMERIC HYMNS AND HoMERICA 117 (Hugh G. Evelyn-White trans., 1967). Mter 
SO years, Zeus relented and Prometheus was freed by Heracles. ld. 
2. In a myth related to us by the poet Hesiod, which reflects the sexist cli-
mate of the time, as mankind's punishment for Prometheus's act of stealing fire, 
Zeus ordered Hephaestus to create Pandora, the first woman, and sent her to 
Earth. ld. at 121. Ignoring Prometheus's warning, Epimetheus married her, al-
lowing her to remove the lid from the box she carried, releasing evil, drudgery 
and pestilence. ld. at 12!. 
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as humanity's preserver in Prometheus Bound.5 That view is echoed 
in English literature, in which Prometheus is frequently depicted 
as a courageous champion ofhumanity.4 In the English language, 
the term Promethean has come to mean boldly creative and defi-
antly original. 5 It is commonly used to describe significant tech-
nological advances. For example, the microprocessor6 and fusion 
power7 have been described as Promethean, as have Gordon 
Moore's laboratory at Fairchild Semiconductor, 8 the technological 
achievements of Japan9 and the creativity of the United States. 10 
Not only in mythology and modem times, but from before the 
time of ancient Greece, technological advances have improved liv-
ing conditions.ll Progress, however, was slow until the eighteenth 
century, when a flood of innovation, called the industrial revolu-
tion, produced a rapid rise in income. 12 The pace of both techno-
3. AESCHYLUS, Promethew &nmd, in PROMETHEUS AND OTHER PLAYS 20, 20-52 
(Philip Vellacott trans., 1961). 
4. See, e.g., 4 GEORGE BYRoN, PRoMETHEUS, THE WoRKS OF LoRD BYRON 48, 
50 (Ernest H. Coleridge ed., 1901) (describing Prometheus as one who lessened 
"the sum of human wretchedness"); 2 PERCY SHELLY, Promethew Unbound, in THE 
CoMPLETE WoRKS OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLY 178 (Roger Ingpen & Walter E. Peck 
eds., 1965) (Prometheus uses man's knowledge as weapon to defeat evil). .. 
5. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1449 
(3d ed. 1992); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1815 (1986). In Greek, Prometheus means foresight. PIERRE 
GRIMAL, A CONCISE DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 376 (Stephen Ker-
shaw ed. 8c A.R. Maxwell-Hyslop trans., 1990). 
6. George Gilder, Galbraithian Truth and Fallacy, FoRBES, Nov. 12, 1979, at 
117, 129 ("There is no way to fathom the full potential of this [microprocessing] 
technology, now in its Promethean infancy."). 
7. See gmeraUy Fusion, Sure-But for the Long Term, FoRBES, jan. 9, 1978, at 
154, 154 (describing mankind's efforts to duplicate fusion reactions that occur on 
sun as "a truly Promethean challenge"). 
8. George Gilder, Where are the Microchip BiUionairest, FoRBES, Oct. 23, 1989, 
at 378-79. 
9. Paul Addison & Mark McQuillan, Promethew Unbound and Unwelcome; Ja-
pan's Economic Leadership Stirs Admiration, Anxiety Across Asia, jAPAN EcoN. j ., Dec. I, 
1990, at 4. 
10. See Andrew Hacker, Bearish on America, FoRTUNE, Nov. 24, 1986, at 213 
(discussing traits of United States that will allow it to remain as world's leading 
economic power) (citing OxFORD ANALYI1CA, AMERICA IN PERSPECTIVE: MAJOR 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE 1990s I ( 1986) ("[The United 
States] has invested so wisely in education, training, research, development and 
other forms of human capital, that it will continue to surprise the world with its 
flexibility, resilience, and sheer Promethean creativity.")). 
II. SeeS. LILLEY, MEN, MAcHINES AND HISTORY: THE STORY OF TooLS AND 
MACHINES IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS 319 (1966) (inventions such as agri-
culture, metallurgy, harnessing of animals and wheeled transport helped trans-
form primitive life into civilization). See generally 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, TECHNOLOGY 440 (15th ed. 1993) (summarizing history of technol-
ogy and its impact on civilized society). 
12. See gmeraUy DAVIDS. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGI· 
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logical advance and economic growth accelerated in the twentieth 
century. 15 The latter half of this century has also yielded clear e~i­
dence of the relation between the two. Income growth in the in-
dustrialized nations during the twentieth century has come not 
primarily from capital accumulation but overwhelmingly from im-
provements in technology, broadly defined. 14 
Recent years have seen a decline in productivity growth in the 
industrialized countries and a concomitant drop in the rate of in-
come growth.• 5 Although the drop in productivity growth has hit 
most industrialized nations, the United States has been hit espe-
cially hard. 16 Observers from across the political spectrum see the 
loss of technological leadership as a source of the current eco-
nomic woes of the United States17 and believe that increasing in-
novative activity, especially by encouraging investment in new 
technologies, worker training, organizational practices and high-
CAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM J 750 TO 
THE PRESENT ( 1969) (providing comparative survey of European industrial 
revolution). 
18. See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 11, at 460 (despite 
immense technological advancements by 1900, following decades saw more ad-
vancement than whole of previous recorded history). 
14. For a discussion ofthe link between income growth and improvements 
in technology, see irifra notes 165-71 and accompanying text. 
15. Set John F. Helliwell &: Alan Chung, Aggregate Productivity and Growth in an 
International Comparative Setting, in INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVl"IY AND CoMPETI-
TIVENESS (Ben G. Hickman ed., 1992) (providing evidence of productivity con-
vergence among Western industrialized nations); see also PAUL KRUGMAN, THE 
AGE OF DIMINISHED ExPECTATIONS 11-12 (1990) (assening that sustained per 
capita income growth can only come from productivity growth); Klaus Conrad, 
lnttrcuuntry Changes in Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector of Five OECD Countries, 
/961-86, in INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITIVENESS ch. 7 (Ben G. 
Hickman ed., 1992) (analyzing changes in productivity gaps between United 
States, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Germany). 
16. Among 12 Western industrialized nations, the United States had the 
lowest growth in labor productivity between 1960 and 1978 and the lowest, ex-
cept for Canada, between 1978 and 1987. Anhur Neef, An International Compari-
son of Manufacturing Productivity and Unit Labor Cost Trends, in INTERNATIONAL 
PRODUCTIVITY AND CoMPETinVENESs,.supra note 15, at 137, 138 (depicting graph-
ically manufacturing labor productivity for 12 countries for period 1960-87). 
The impact on the United States has been exacerbated by the sharp acceleration 
in earnings inequality, which in combination with the slow economic growth has 
reduced the earnings of many less educated workers. Frank Levy&: Richard J. 
Murnane, U.S. Earnings Lewis and Earnings IntquiJlity: A Rtvilw of Recent Trnuls and 
Proposed Explanations, 80 j. EcoN. LITERATURE 1333, 1333 (1992). 
17. The declining pace of technological innovation is panially responsible 
for the dramatic fall in the growth of U.S. business sector productivity from 
2.92% per year between 1947 and 1978 to 1.01% per year between 1973 and 
1987. F.M. SCHERER&: DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 614 (3d ed. 1990). 
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tech industries is part of the solution. 18 Commentators have iden-
tified several factors in the U.S. economy that distort incentives 
and retard economic growth, including the federal income tax, 
which imposes a higher burden on corporate than on 
noncorporate investment.•9 This Article describes another 
growth retarding distortion caused by the federal corporate in-
come tax. The culprit is the favorable treatment of debt relative to 
equity, most significantly the corporate interest deduction. The 
thesis of this Article is that the corporate interest deduction, which 
appears neutral because it permits all corporations to deduct in-
terest, distorts the allocation of capital within the economy by en-
couraging investment in tangible, fixed assets and safe projects 
and discouraging investment in .intangible assets, growth opportu-
nities and risky projects. Thus, traditional technologies and in-
IS. Many commentators advocate a concened and direct government effort 
to increase investment in critical high-tech industries. Sn, e.g., Lewis M. Brans· 
comb, Dots America Nuda Tef/anowgy Policy'!, HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 
24, 25 (arguing that government should stimulate demand for innovative tech-
nologies by "encouraging collaborative research among companies and ... uni-
versities . . . and by helping to develop the tools and techniques that all 
companies need to be more productive"); Clyde ~stowitz & Kevin Kearns, For-
get the Q!Jiclc Fix,· Fundamental Problem is Our Emplaasis on Consumption Over Saving and 
Investment, RoLL CALL, Poucv BRIEFING No. 37 (1992); Roben Kuttner, Facing Up 
to Industrial PolicJ, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 22, 42 (arguing 
that tax and regulatory treatment of America's fin-.ncial markets needs to be re-
formed to bolster "long-term investment in technologies, production processes 
and people"); Robert B. Reich, Up the Workers: Industrial PoiU, Reconsidered, THE 
NEw REPUBUC, May 13, 1991, at 21, 24 (arguing that United States government 
has imponant role to play in emphasizing emergin' technologies "which are 
likely to form the foundation stones of future industnes"). Even some critics of 
industrial policy favor the federal government channeling more resources to re-
search and development generally. Sn, e.g., Michael Boskin, ADDRESS AT THE EX-
1M BANK CoNFERENCE FOR ExPORTERS AND CoMMERCIAL BANKERS (Mar. 15, 
1990); Paul Krugman, Spend: A I..ibtTal Economic Program, THE NEw REPUBUC, Dec. 
23 & 30, 1991, at 20 (providing "wish list" of what new economic program ought 
to include and proposing more government spending on education and infra-
structure). Still others argue that reducing the tax rate on capital gains is the way 
to spur such activity. Su EcoNOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 130-33 (1990) 
(providing suggestions for governmental policies which can increase investment). 
19. Other factors mentioned by commentators include differences in the 
cost of capital, the shon-term outlook of business management, the dire state of 
primary and secondary public education, insufficient savings and capital forma-
tion, a decline in entrepreneurship through a corporate reward system that en-
courages playing it safe and the rise of protectionism which reduces competition. 
Sn RESEARCH AND POUCY COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVEL· 
OPMENT; PRoDucnvTIY Poucv: KEY ro THE NAnoN's EcoNOMIC FUTURE (1983); 
S« also MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOUS ET AL, MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE COM· 
PETJTJVE EDGE 42-45 (1989) (classifying cause of United States' productivity 
problem into six categories: outdated business strategies, preoccupation with 
short-term results, technological weaknesses in development and production, ne-
glect of human resources, failures of cooperation and conflicting purposes of 
government and industry). Some of these factors are very controversial. 
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dustries are encouraged at the expense of emerging technologies, 
new production methods and high-tech industries. 
The capital distortion occurs because the federal corporate 
income tax, which taxes corporations as separate entities and al-
lows corporations a deduction for interest but does not permit a 
corresponding deduction for dividends or retained earnings, en-
courages corporations to issue debt. This Article, which relies on 
recent economic scholarship demonstrating and explaining why 
corporations in different industries have different debt capacities, 
argues that because debt financing is tax-favored over equity fi-
nancing, the larger an industry's debt capacity, the lower is its to-
tal effective tax rate and, therefore, the lower is its cost of capital. 
Accordingly, among projects with the same expected net present 
value, the federal corporate income tax encourages investment in 
projects with a large debt capacity and discourages investment in 
projects with a small capacity. In general, those activities with a 
large debt capacity have less earnings variability, fewer prospects 
for growth through profitable investment and employ more tangi-
ble assets. Conversely, riskier activities with more numerous op-
portunities for profitable investment that use more intangible 
assets have a small debt capacity. Thus, the federal corporate in-
come tax discourages investment in the latter group of projects. 
Therefore, not only does the tax misallocate capital between the 
corporate and noncorporate sectors, as is widely recognized by 
commentators,20 it also misallocates capital within the corporate 
sector. This misallocation of capital within the corporate sector is 
an inefficient and undesirable consequence of existing tax law, 
which has been overlooked by scholars and policymakers. It also 
operates to discourage investment in precisely those industries, 
technologies and production methods that many observers see as 
critical to the nation's economic future. 
Section II of this Article reviews the literature on optimal cap-
ital structure.21 Section III, the heart of the Article, argues that 
20. Arnold Harberger 6nt argued that the classical corporate income tax 
misallocates capital between the corporate and noncorporate seaon. See gtnnTJlly 
Arnold C. Harberger, TM l'llridnt£e of thl Corporation Income Tax, 70 j. PoL. EcoN. 
215 (1962). jane Gravelle estimates that the overall effective tax rate on corpo-
rate capital is 42%, which is 70% higher than the estimated 25% rate on 
noncorporate investment. S« jANE G. GRAVELLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 
CoRPORATE TAX INTEGRATION: IssuEs AND OPTioNs 2 ( 1991 ). Thus, for example, 
if an investor's required after-tax return is 8%, then the required rate of return is 
10% for noncorporate investments and 18.79% for corporate investments. 
21. Readen who can probably skip this material without losing the argu-
ment are those with a grounding in capital structure theory at the level explained 
in RICHARD A. 8REALEY Be STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
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the corporate interest deduction distorts investment, thereby mak-
ing the nation poorer. Section IV argues that the tax advantage to 
debt steers capital away from risky projects, growth opportunities 
and intangible assets. Section V seeks to quantify the capital dis-
tortion caused by the corporate interest deduction and argues that 
the distortion should be remedied. Section VI provides a discus-
sion of different methods for remedying the capital distortion and 
examines the effectiveness of the various corporate integration 
proposals in reducing that distortion. Section VII is the 
conclusion. 
II. UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTIJRE 
It would be difficult to understand the consequences of the 
corporate interest deduction without first considering how corpo-
rations set capital structure. Although disagreements and puzzles 
remain, the finance community largely agrees on the economic 
factors that have major influences on corporate capital structure. 22 
Capital structure theory has both normative and positive ele-
ments. The normative question that capital structure theory ad-
dresses is what combination of debt and equity minimizes the 
corporation's cost of capital. Choosing the capital structure that 
minimizes the corporation's cost of capital is desirable because it 
maximizes the value of the corporation. Positive theory addresses 
the question of how corporations set capital structure. It is rea-
sonable to assume that corporations tend towards minimizing 
their cost of capital, as normative theory suggests, because if they 
did not, investors aware of this unexploited opportunity could 
profit by buying the corporation and adjusting its capital 
structure. 25 
A. The Role of Taxes 
Taxes are one influence on corporate capital structure.24 The 
cbs. 17 8c 18 (4th ed. 1991), STEPHEN A. Ross 8c RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD, 
CoRPORATE FINANCE cbs. 15 8c 16 (3d ed. 1993), or WILLIAM A. KLEIN &joHN C. 
CoFFEE, jR., BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC PRIN-
CIPLES 306-38 (4th ed. 1990). 
22. Set Ross 8c WESTERFIELD, SUfWtJ note 21, at 472. 
23. KLEIN 8c CoFFEE, supra note 21, at 306-07. 
24. In a classic paper, Franco Modigliani and Menon Miller showed that if 
there are no taxes, no transaction costs and investment policy is fixed, then the 
financial policies of a corporation are irrelevant. Franco Modigliani 8c Merton H. 
Miller, The Cost of Capital, CurportJtiqn Finance and 1M Tlwry of lnvestmmt, 48 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 261, 268-71 (1958). Thus, if capital structure matters it must be be-
cause of the impact of taxes, transaction costs or investment policy. 
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federal corporate income tax, which subjects corporations to tax 
on their taxable income as separate entities,25 is currently 34% for 
all but the smallest corporations.26 In calculating taxable income, 
a corporation subtracts the interest it pays debtholders, 27 but it 
cannot deduct the dividends it pays shareholders or the earnings it 
retains. Thus, for every dollar that the corporation earns before 
interest and taxes, the corporation can retain $.66 of earnings, pay 
a $.66 dividend or pay $1 interest. Accordingly, every $1000 bond 
paying interest at 10% that the corporation issues, using the pro-
ceeds to repurchase equity, will reduce the corporation's annual 
tax bill by $34.28 Because debt has such an attractive feature, the 
corporation should always have debt in its capital structure. 
Moreover, interest deductibility implies that the corporation's 
value increases by issuing additional debt.29 
The corporate income tax is not the only tax that influences 
corporate capital structures. There is also the investor-level tax 
on equity and debt, which cannot be ignored because the income 
from debt and equity is taxed differently. 30 Although dividends 
received by individual investors are taxed at the investor's ordi-
nary income rate, as is interest, much of the return to equity oc-
curs as appreciation in value, which incurs a different and highly 
favorable tax treatment.31 Appreciation is not taxed until the 
25. I.R.C. § ll(a) (1988) 
26. See I.R.C. § ll(b) (imposing tax of 34% on corporations with taxable 
income exceeding $75,000). 
27. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (granting deduction for all interest paid or accrued 
within taxable year on corporate indebtedness). 
28. This is arrived at by multiplying the annual interest payment of$ I 00 by 
the 34% tax rate. 
29. Modigliani Be Miller, supra note 24, at272-73 (explaining why deduction 
of interest expense in computing taxable corporate profits cannot be replicated 
by investors borrowing and purchasing stock in unlevered corporation). The 
present value of an annual tax deduction of$34 indefinitely, discounted at 10%, 
is $340. Thus, $340 is the value of the tax shield created by replacing equity with 
a $1000 bond. Modigliani and Miller's original anicle did not properly value 
interest tax shields. They described the correct method for valuing interest tax 
shields in a later anicle. See Franco Modigliani Be Menon H. Miller, Crwporate 
Income Taxes and the Ont of CapiiiJJ: ..4 Correction, 53 AM. EcoN. REv. 433, 435-37 
(1963). 
30. If the income from debt and equity were taxed identically, then the tax 
advantage from corporate debt would be as described above. For a discussion of 
the tax advantage of debt if the income from debt and equity are taxed identi-
cally, see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. See BREALEY Be MYERS, supra 
note 21, at 427-28 (illustrating relative tax advantage of taxing income from debt 
and equity identically). 
31. Debt appreciation is also favorably taxed, but appreciation is a larger 
ponion ofthe return to equity than to debt. See BREALEY 8c MYERS, supra note 21, 
at 426-29 (explaining effect of debt in corporate and personal taxes); Theodore 
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stock is sold, and even then it is only taxed at the rate prevailing 
for capital gains, which is often below the rate on ordinary in-
come. 52 In addition, if an investor dies holding appreciated assets, 
the appreciation will forever escape tax.55 For the above reasons, 
the personal tax rate on equity is likely to be below the personal 
tax rate on debt, and could be as low as zero.54 
Merton Miller recognized that corporations trying to maxi-
mize their value will choose a capital structure that minimizes total 
taxes, not just corporate taxes.55 For every dollar the business 
earns that is supported by debt, the total tax to the investor is the 
personal tax on debt income. Alternatively, if the earnings are 
supported by equity, the total tax to the investor is the corporate 
and personal tax on equity income.56 Because tax rates vary 
among investors, the corporation cannot choose whichever is 
cheaper, debt or equity, because neither is necessarily cheaper. 
To understand how corporations set their capital structures, it is 
necessary to use Miller's argument based on progressive taxation. 
To make the argument easier to follow, start with the assump-
tion that the personal tax rate on equity is zero for all taxpayers. 57 
This assumption implies that the total tax to the investor from eq-
uity financing is the corporate tax and the total tax from debt fi-
nancing is the investor's personal tax.58 In equilibrium, so as to 
S. Sims, Long-Term Debt, the Term Structure of Interest and tlu Case for Accrual Taxation, 
4 7 TAX L. REv. 313, 35 7 ( 1992) (accrual tax more imponant for debt than 
equity). 
32. The maximum capital gains tax rate is currently 28%. I.R.C. § I (h) 
(Supp. II 1990). In contrast, the top marginal personal rate is 39.6%. Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13202, 107 Stat. 461, 461 
(1993). The tax treatment of appreciation does not account for the time value of 
money. See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capillll Gains Taxation, 81 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 167, 167 (1991) (discussing taxpayers' willingness to hold appreciated as-
sets to defer taxes on accrued gains). 
33. This is because the investor's heirs will receive a tax basis equal to the 
fair market value of the securities at the time of the investor's death. I.R.C. 
§ 1014(a)(l) (1988). 
34. See GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 10. 
35. Menon H. Miller, Debt and TOJW, 32 J. FIN. 261, 268-72 (1977). 
36. Let T r denote the personal tax rate on debt, T Pt: the personal tax rate on 
equity income and T c the corporate tax rate. The total tax to the investor from 
holding debt is T p, leaving the investor with I - T P· The total tax to the investor 
from holding equity is I - (I - T c) (I - T Pt:), leaving the investor with (I - T c) 
(I - TP£). 
37. This assumption, though not essential for the argument, simplifies the 
discussion. 
38. The total tax to the investor from holding debt is still T p, leaving the 
investor with I - Tr. The total tax to the investor from holding equity becomes 
T c. leaving the investor with I - T c· 
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minimize total taxes, investors with a marginal tax rate below the 
corporate rate hold only debt, whereas investors with a marginal 
tax rate above the corporate rate hold only equity. An investor 
with a marginal tax rate equal to the corporate rate is called the 
marginal investor and can hold either debt or equity or both. ' 9 
Because financial advisors have long been aware of the tax 
consequences of debt and equity, Miller argued that any advan-
tage from issuing debt has long been competed away. Thus, it is 
likely that the economy is in equilibrium with respect to the issu-
ance of debt and equity. Accordingly, the tax treatment has an 
impact on the optimal debt-to-equity ratio for the corporate sector 
as a whole, but there is no optimal debt-to-equity ratio for an indi-
vidual corporation. Thus, despite the deductibility of interest pay-
ments, a corporation cannot change its value by changing its 
capital structure.•o 
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Act),41 the corpo-
39. An example might make this clear. Assume all corporations are taxed at 
a rate of 40% and that the marginal investment project generates a return of 
10%. This implies that all investors receive 6% after-tax when there is only eq-
uity. Assume further that there is a system of progressive taxation, with some 
investors tax-exempt and others taxed at rates as high as 60%, with investors 
scattered over the full range. The first corporation to issue debt can offer a re-
turn just over 6%, say 7%; this will induce tax-exempt investors to buy the 
bonds. Once one corporation issues debt, other corporations follow. Soon all 
tax-exempt investors have their entire investment portfolios in debt. Assume the 
next large group of investors is in the 20% tax bracket. These investors would 
receive only 5.6% after-tax if they purchased corporate bonds payin' 7%, which 
is less than the 6% they receive from equity. To induce these mvestors to 
purchase debt, corporations have to increase the interest rate to more than 7.5%. 
Assume they set the interest rate at 8%. This is still attractive to the corporations 
because they save 2%, the difference between 10% and 8%. The process of issu-
ing new debt continues until the interest rate on debt is 10%, at which point 
corporations no longer derive an advantage from issuing debt. If, for example, 
the interest rate was 12%, corporations would lose 2% by issuing debt; they 
would, then, issue equity and retire debt until the interest rate fell to 10%. 
40. Miller stated his conclusion as follows: 
There will be an equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt ... and 
hence an equilibrium debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector as a 
whole. But there 'UHIUid M 110 optimum debt ratio for any indivilluaJ firm. Com-
panies following a no-leverage or low leverage strategy (like I.B.M. or 
Kodak) would find a market among investors in the high tax brackets; 
those opting for a high leverage strategy (like the electric utilities) would 
find the natural clientele for their securities at the other end of the scale. 
But one clientele is as good as the other. And in this important sense it 
would still be true that the value of any finn, in equilibrium, would be 
independent of its capital structure, despite the deductibility of interest 
payments in computing corporate income taxes. 
Miller, mpra note 35, at 269. 
41. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
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rate tax rate was 46%.42 Individual tax rates were progressive 
with a maximum individual tax rate of 50%.0 Prior to 1981, the 
maximum individual tax rate on investment income was 70%. 
Thus, Miller's argument implies that corporate debt would have 
increased after personal tax rates were lowered in 1981.44 More-
over, assuming a personal tax rate on equity income of zero, be-
cause the top personal rate exceeded the corporate rate, there 
would have been throughout this period an upper limit on the ag-
gregate amount of debt below 100%.45 However, today, because 
the 1986 Act reduced the top personal tax rate (currently 33%) 
below the statutory corporate rate (34%),46 the Miller model im-
plies that close to 100% debt is optimal in the post-1986 
economy.47 
Of course, the Internal Revenue Service would disallow inter-
est deductions for any corporation that had close to 100% debt.48 
42. I.R.C. § 11 (b)(5) (1982), amended by I.R.C. § 11 (b) (1988). 
43. I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (1982), amended by I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (1988). 
44. Whether leverage increased following the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34,95 Stat. 172 (1981), depends on how lever-
age is measured. For example, in 1981, nonfinancial corporations as a whole 
withdrew a sizeable amount of equity from the market, but the aggregate book 
value debt-to-equity ratio fell. Set Margaret M. Blair &:. Roben E. Litan, Corporate 
Leverage and Leveraged Buyouts in the 1980's, in DEBT, TAXES AND CORPORATE RE-
STRUcrtJRINC 43, 49-53 (John B. Shoven &:Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990) (compar-
ing figure 8 on p. 53 with figure 5 on p. 49). However measured, corporate debt 
increased substantially during the 1980s. TREASURY DEP'T REPORT, INTEGRATION 
OF THE INDMDUAL AND CoRPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME 
ONCE 7-11 (1992). Even so, ERTA introduced safe harbor leasing among other 
reforms, making it difficult to isolate the effect of rate changes. See, e.g., Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172, 203 
(1981), reptGied by, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-514, § 201, 100 Stat. 
2085, 2121 (1986) (providing special rules for leases). Another (independent?) 
factor in the growth of corporate debt during the 1980s is the development of the 
high-yield (junk) bond market. 
45. The equity of a corporation with a capital structure that is 100% debt is 
wonhless because there is no possibility of the equity receiving anything of value. 
This is a much stricter condition than the condition that the market value of the 
corporation is less than the face value of the debt because the possibility of good 
fonune gives the equity value. Although it is rare to find corporations with 100% 
debt, even in reorganization, I 00% debt is a useful construct as an upper limit on 
leverage. See Ku:1N &:. COFFEE, supra note 21, at 335-38 (using approximately 
100% debt in example to illustrate limits on use of debt). 
46. Set gmerally Gene Steuerle, Postwar Clumges in tl&e Overall TtiX System, 54 
TAX NOTES 1163, 1167-70 (1992) (discussing recent history of tax rates). 
4 7. The incentive to issue I 00% debt is even stronger if the effective per-
sonal tax rate on equity income is positive, which it is because of dividends and 
forced sales. See GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 5. 
48. See I.R.C. § 385 (1988) (providing IRS with authority to challenge cor-
porate taxpayers' claims for interest deductions and factors to be taken into ac-
count by IRS). 
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However, the Service rarely contests interest deductions on corpo-
rations, even those with debt-to-equity ratios as high as 10-to-1.49 
Yet few corporations have a debt-to-equity ratio anywhere near 
this large/so and some very successful corporations have little or 
no debt in their capital structure. 
Jane Gravelle estimates that the spread between the effective 
total tax rates of equity and debt is around 50%.51 This estimate, 
if accurate, implies that a corporation could reduce the total tax 
burden on its investors by 50% by issuing debt and repurchasing 
equity. Although estimates of the spread vary,5~ there is a consen-
sus that there is a large tax advantage from debt. 55 Understanding 
why many corporations issue little debt, despite the potential tax 
savings, is the subject of the next section, which introduces the 
costs of financial distress. 
B. The Rok of Financial Distress 
The Miller model is based on two critical assumptions: that 
bankruptcy is costless and that all interest tax shields can be used 
or transferred at full value. As these two critical assumptions are 
49. There is a long history of attempts to provide clear rules to distinguish 
debt from equity. See BoRIS I. BriTKER & jAMES S. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4ft'~! 4.02-.0!J (1987) (discussing 
factors that impact classification of investment instruments). The current 
method for distinguishing debt from equity is to look at a variety of factors, in-
cluding the debt-to-equity ratio, the intent of the panies, whether all investors 
hold debt and equity in similar proponions and whether interest is contingent. 
/d. at 11 4.04. A myriad of other factors also affect the determination of whether a 
panicular investment instrument represents debt or equity. Set, e.g., In rr Lane, 
742 F.2d Ull, 1!114-15 (lith Cir. 1984) (providing list ofthineen factors that 
merit consideration when making debt/equity determination); Fin Hay Realty 
Co. v. United States, !198 F.2d 694, 697 (Sd Cir. 1968) (explaining that ultimate 
question in making debt/equity determination is whether stockholders' entire in-
vestment represents risk capital subject to fonunes of corporate venture or 
whether debtor-creditor relationship exists between corporation and share-
holder); set gmertdiJ William T. Plumb, Jr., Tire Fttlerall'fiCOIM Tox Significance of 
Corporate Debt: .A Crilical.A1Illl.ysis tmd a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REv. S69 ( 1971) (provid-
ing thorough discussion of factors relevant in determining whether debt should 
be respected or reclassified as equity). 
50. The average capital structure of a leveraged buyout in 1988 had 87% 
debt and IS% equity. Mark Gertler & R. Glenn Hubbard, TOJClltion, CorfHwaJ.e Cap-
il4l Structure and Firt.tmcild Dislrlss, in 4 TAX Poucv AND THE EcoNOMY 4S, 47-48 
(Lawrence Summers ed., 1990). 
51. GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at II. 
52. Set Genter & Hubbard, supra note 50, at 59 (giving examples of different 
experts' estimates of spread). For example, the spread between the effective total 
tax rates of equity and debt is around SO%. /d. 
55. S. TUASURY DEP'T REPoRT, sufmJ note 44, at ch. I (discussing tax ad-
vantage from debt financing). 
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relaxed, the model's conclusions break down, and each corpora-
tion has an optimal capital structure with less than 100% debt. 
I. The Declining Value of Tax Shields 
The Miller model assumes that corporations can always real-
ize full value for their interest tax shields. This is not so. Because 
the federal government does not provide tax refunds to loss cor-
porations and because tax losses are not easily salable, corpora-
tions have a limited capacity to use the interest tax shields 
generated by debt. 54 Consequently, as leverage increases, the 
marginal value of the interest deduction falls. 
If corporate after-interest income is negative, the corporation 
does not receive a rebate of34% of the loss; instead, its annual tax 
liability is zero. The tax law provides that the corporation can use 
losses to obtain a refund of corporate income taxes paid in the 
previous three years. Losses that are not used to offset income 
accrued in the prior three years are suspended and carried for-
ward to succeeding years where they can be used to reduce taxable 
income to zero.55 Mter fifteen years, unused losses expire.56 
Thus, interest deductions beyond those that reduce the corpora-
tion's three-year income to zero do not generate a current benefit. 
Of course, current losses that are not used until later years have a 
smaller present value than those used currently, and the decline 
increases with the delay. 
The tax law contains numerous rules designed to hamper the 
ability of corporations to transfer losses. 57 The existence of sub-
stantial losses that corporations are not currently using implies 
that these provisions have an effect. 58 
in the context of the Miller model, consider one corporation 
with an uncertain earnings stream that cannot transfer its excess 
tax shields. 59 Such a corporation would not want to have so much 
54. Tax specialists say that the corporate tax does not provide corporations 
with full loss offsets but only with incomplete loss offsets. 
55. I.R.C. § 172 (b)(l)(A)(i) (1988). 
56. I.R.C. § 172 (b)(l)(A)(ii). 
57. Set B11TKER 8c EusncE, supra note 49, at 11 16.20 (1987) (discussing 
weapons available to Internal Revenue Service to combat acquiring companies 
seeking to use loss-canyovers of acquired companies). 
58. Rosanne Altshuler 8c Alan j. Auerbach, The Significtmct of Tax I...aw Asym-
metries: An Empirical Investigation, 105 QJ. EcoN. 61, 70-75 (1990). This does not 
imply that loses can never be transferred; the leasing industry proves otherwise. 
It suggests only that there are effective limits on transferability. 
59. Assume the economy has a corporate tax rate and progressive personal 
taxes with a maximum above the statutory corporate rate. 
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debt that there was a chance of it having a taxable loss, which 
would occur if its annual income (after deductions including inter-
est) were negative. Accordingly, in the event of a loss, the present 
value of the deduction on the last dollar of interest is less than the 
statutory rate of$.34. Assuming the economy was at a Miller equi-
librium, and the corporation had a chance of not using its entire 
interest deduction in a given year, the corporation would not be in 
equilibrium because the expected present value of the corpora-
tion's deduction on the last dollar of interest would be less than 
the statutory corporate rate. Thus, the possibility that the corpo-
ration might not currently use the entire deduction implies that 
the total tax on debt exceeds the total tax on equity. It follows 
that, as long as there was any chance that some of the interest 
would not be immediately deductible, the equityholders would 
benefit by issuing equity and using the proceeds to retire debt.60 
As the exception becomes the rule, and more corporations 
resemble the one in the above paragraph, the results of the Miller 
model break down. There is no longer an aggregate optimal debt 
level for the economy, with all corporations indifferent towards 
their capital structure. Instead, each corporation has an optimal 
debt level at which the expected marginal value of the tax shield 
equals the personal tax rate of the marginal taxpayer in the 
economy.61 
For any corporation, the value of the marginal tax shield will 
equal the statutory tax rate only if the corporation is cenain to use 
the deduction currently. For very low levels of debt, this might be 
the case for some corporations. Nevenheless, as leverage in-
creases, the chance of not being able to use the deduction (cur-
rently, if at all) rises, thereby reducing the expected realizable tax 
shield on additional debt. Accordingly, the expected realizable 
tax shield falls as leverage increases.62 The available evidence 
60. If there were any chance that the corporation could have a negative 
before-interest income, then it would retire all of its debt. The discussion ig-
nores any tax on appreciation of the debt, which is usually small. 
61. Harry DeAngelo and Ronald W. Masulis, optinud Cafrital Structure Urullr 
Corpqrutuflll Pmtmld Tamrion, 8J. FIN. EcoN. ~. ~-18 (1980). The identity of the 
marginal taxpayer is determined through the interaction of all firms and inves-
tors. /d. at ~. This assumes that the income from equity escapes personal tax. /d. 
at 11. If it is taxed, the personal-level tax advantage to the marginal investor of 
equity replaces the tax rate of the marginal investor in the equilibrium condition 
described in the text. /d. 
62. RONALD W. MAsuus, THE DEBT/EQ.UITY CHOICE 25-~0 (1988). 
Evidence supports the importance of taxes in corporate capital structure de-
cisions. S. DeAngelo & Masulis, sufmJ note 61. For example, the announcement 
of capital structure changes is linked to stock price changes. MAsuus, SllfmJ, at 
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supports the conclusion that corporations have a limited capacity 
for the interest deductions generated by debt because the effective 
corporate tax rate is below the statutory rate.65 
2. Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress 
In addition to the declining value of the interest tax shields, 
the costs associated with financial distress discourage leverage. 
These costs are commonly divided into direct and indirect costs. 
a. Direct Costs 
Once a corporation files for protection from its creditors, or 
creditors to whom the corporation has defaulted file to enforce 
their claims, an elaborate and expensive bankruptcy proceeding, 
perhaps lasting many years, commences.64 The purpose of this 
proceeding is to determine whether the business should continue 
or be liquidated and to resolve the competing claims to the corpo-
ration and its assets. 65 
24-25. In addition, revisions in the Internal Revenue Code cause rapid changes 
in corporate capital structures. /d. at 28. 
63. Rosanne Altshuler and Alan Auerbach estimate that during the early 
1980s, when the statutory tax rate was 46%, the average effective corporate tax 
rate was around 32%. See Altshuler & Auerbach, supra note 58, at 80 (concluding 
that effective marginal tax rates for corporations varied from 18.9% to 38.6% in 
1982 when statutory tax rate was 46%). Roger Gordon and jeffrey MacKie-Ma-
son estimate that in 1988, when the statutory rate was 34%, the effective corpo-
rate tax rate was around 29%. See Gertler & Hubbard, supra note 50, at 59 (citing 
Roger H. Gordon & jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Eff«ts of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
on Corporclte Financial Policy tmd Organizational Form, University of Michigan Mimeo-
graph (Sept. 1989)). 
64. There is extensive literature on bankruptcy, much of it critical. Michael 
Bradley Be Michael Rosensweig, The Unlmabll Case For Chapter II, I 0 I YALE LJ. 
1043, 1045 (1992); see, e.g., Douglass G. Baird, The U1144SJ Case for Corporclte Reor-
ganization, 15 J. LEGAL Sroo. 127 (1986) (criticizing bankruptcy law); Lucian Ayre 
Bebchuk,A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 H.uv. L. REV. 775 (1988) 
(same). 
65. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of 
Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 j.L EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 253, 253-54 (1992); 
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity :r Sluzre in the Banlc-
rupkJ Reorganization of large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 127-
30 (1990) (describing legal context of bankruptcy proceedings). Ifa corporation 
becomes bankrupt either its assets will be sold to satisfy creditors claims or the 
corporation will be reorganized. Bebchult Be Chang, supra, at 253. In either case 
the absolute priority rule requires that investors receive value in accordance with 
their priority. LoPucki & Whitford, supra, at 134. Frequently, this means that 
equityholders are cut out. Bebchuk Be Chang, supra, at 254. Nevertheless, what 
debtholders receive depends on how much value can be realized from the com-
pany's assets. /d. 
Although the law provides that in li'{uidation debtholders are paid in full 
before equityholders receive anything, equttyholders control the corporation and 
their ability to delay a resolution of the bankruptcy provides them with bargain-
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The direct costs of financial distress are those legal and ad-
ministrative costs that the corporation and its stakeholders incur 
at all stages before and during the corporate bankruptcy.66 As-
suming that these costs are not so small that they can be ignored, 
then under reasonable assumptions expected bankruptcy costs 
vary directly with the probability of bankruptcy, which varies di-
rectly with leverage. Thus, as corporate leverage increases, ex-
pected bankruptcy costs rise.67 
Although the magnitude of such direct costs have long inter-
ested economists, the first study of bankruptcy costs was published 
in 1977 by Jerold Warner, who examined the legal and administra-
tive costs of eleven railroad bankruptcies.68 Warner reports that 
the average cost was $2 million, which was 5.3% of the market 
value of the railroad's outstanding debt and equity securities just 
prior to bankruptcy and 1.4% of their market value five years ear-
lier.69 Because of Warner's small sample, the extensive regulation 
of the industry, and the special bankruptcy procedures that rail-
roads followed, the applicability of Warner's results to other in-
dustries is unclear.70 More recent studies by Lawrence Weiss and 
Michelle White, using larger samples, suggest that direct bank-
ruptcy costs average approximately 3% of the asset value of cor-
porations with more than $100 million in assets and larger 
portions for smaller corporations. 71 
b. Indirect Costs 
Although there are no good quantitative measures of indirect 
costs of financial distress, financial economists believe that such 
ing leverage from which they can often extract a payment. /d.; LoPucki 8c Whit-
ford, supra, at 127-31. 
66. Ross 8c WESTERFIELD, supra note 21, at 454. Because the lawyers get 
paid before the creditors do, one effect of bankruptcy is to reduce the value dis-
tributed among the creditors. Thus, ex-post, the costs of bankruptcy are effec-
tively paid by the firm's creditors. However, ex-ante, the equityholders bear the 
present value of bankruptcy costs, because creditors, realizing that there will be 
less value to split among themselves in the event of bankruptcy, will require a 
higher interest rate. The additional interest amounts to a transfer to creditors as 
compensation for expected bankruptcy costs. /d. at 453, 458. 
67. BREALEY 8c MYERS, supra note 21, at 436-37. 
68. jerold B. Warner, Banltruptcy Costs: Srnn4 Evidence, 32 J. FJN. 337 (1977). 
69. See itJ. at 340 tbl.1, 343 tbl.5. 
70. MAsuus, supra note 62, at 33. 
71. Lawrence A. Weiss, Banltruptcy /liSolution: Direct Costs and ViolaiUm of Prior-
ity Claims, 27 j. FIN. EcoN. 285, 288-90 (1990); Michellej. White, Banltruptq Costs 
and the NftJI Banltruptcy Code, 38J. FIN. 477,486-87 (1983). 
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indirect costs exceed the direct costs. 72 These indirect costs cap-
ture the difficulties and inefficiencies of running a corporation that 
is either threatened with or going through bankruptcy. Bank-
ruptcy can undennine management's control over tlie corpora-
tion's operations. However, the largest indirect costs are incurred 
before bankruptcy when the corporation is in financial distress. 
These costs are of two kinds. The first is the corporation's ten-
dency to pursue non-value maximizing strategies; the second is in-
terference with the corporation's relationships. 
If a single individual managed and held all of the corpora-
tion's outstanding securities, there would be no conflicts. For ex-
ample, a sole proprietor will choose to go skiing rather than spend 
the weekend reviewing financial statements when the pleasures of 
time on the slopes is worth more to the sole proprietor than the 
financial rewards of a better understanding of the business. The 
sole proprietor internalizes both the skiing and the profit. Except 
for very small corporations, it is not practical for one individual to 
make every decision and hold all securities. Several layers of man-
agement and widely disbursed holdings of the corporation's se-
curities characterize the modern business corporation. As a 
result, rational, self-interested individuals will not internalize all 
consequences of their actions. For example, although the man-
ager alone enjoys the weekend ski trip, the manager does not re-
ceive all of the benefits of the manager's additional work, much of 
which accrue to the corporation's investors. This provides the 
manager with an incentive to shirk responsibility.'' 
Financial economists have identified several potential con-
flicts within the modem corporation. These include conflicts be-
tween equityholders and managers74 and between equityholders 
72. Su BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 21, at 457-39; Ross & WESTERFIELD, 
suJWa note 21, at 454-58. 
73. Michael jensen and William Meckling argue that because investors are 
aware of these conflicts, firms have incentives to restrain them. Michael C. Jen-
sen & William H. Meckling, Tlwry of the Firm: M~l BeluzvUw, Agmcy Costs and 
Oummhip Slnlcturt, 5 j. FIN. EcoN. 305, 325-28 (1976). Nevenheless, because 
enforcement is costly and imperfect, these conflicts can be reduced but not elimi-
nated. /d. at 524-25; see also Eugene F. Fama, Agmcy Problmu and tlw Tlwry of tlw 
Firm, 88j. PoL. EcoN. 288 (1980) (explaining that market aids in disciplining and 
giving opponunities to management). 
74. ADOLPH A. BERLE,jR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MoDERN CoRPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220-52 (1953). Managers have an incentive to pay 
themselves large salaries, provide generous perks and lavish workin' conditions 
and not work very hard. The investors might have a hard time momtoring their 
managers and might therefore find it difficult to restrain their behavior. jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 75, at 527-28; see MAsuus, supra note 62, at ch. 6 (reviewing 
literature on equityholder-manager conflicts of interest). 
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and debtholders. 75 Many researchers have examined the equi-
tyholder-debtholder conflict and the consistent message is that 
these conflicts create incentives for equityholders to take actions 
that benefit themselves at the expense of debtholders. 76 
The conflicts that exist between equityholders, who indirectly 
select the management of the corporation by electing the board of 
directors, and the corporation's creditors are magnified as the cor-
poration's finances deteriorate. Indeed, the lower the market 
value of the equity relative to that of the debt, the more likely it is 
that the course of action that maximizes the equity's value is not 
the one that maximizes the corporation's value. The extent to 
which corporations pursue non-value maximizing policies repre-
sent one source of the indirect costs of financial distress. Financial 
economists have identified several such strategies. The two that 
follow are the most important in the context of this Article. 
One strategy that a management responsive to the interests of 
its equityholders might take is to increase the value of the equity at 
the expense of the debt by increasing the corporation's risk. Be-
cause oflimited liability, when the risk of the corporation's under-
lying business is increased, equityholders receive a 
disproponionate share of any gain whereas debtholders suffer a 
disproponionate sh3:re of any loss. Thus, equityholders can gain 
when the corporation pursues a risky project that has a negative 
expected value. In the financial literature, this is called asset sub-
stitution. 77 The asset substitution problem is associated with fi-
75. Equity selects the corporation's board of directors, which in turn hires 
the management, who operate the business. The management is responsible to 
the shareholders, to whom it owes various fiduciary duties. The management 
does not owe corresponding duties to its creditors. Instead, its obligations to its 
debtholders are determined by the bond indenture. Accordingly, in spite of the 
conflicts that exist between management and equity, the management of a corpo-
ration is thought to be and is generally treated as more responsive to equity than 
to debt. Su STEWART C. MYERS, SnLL SEARCHING FOR 0PnMAL CAPITAL STRuc-
TURE 11 (Working Paper, rev. version, june 1990). 
76. Su MAsuus, SUfml note 62, at S5 (citing other relevant sources). 
77. jensen&: Meckling, SUfml note 7S, at SS4-S7. An example might be use-
ful. Consider a corporation that has the opponunity of investing $60 in a project 
that has three equally-likely possible outcomes. The project will either yield 
$100 (a gain of $40), $SO (a loss of $SO), or $20 (a loss of $40). The project, 
thus, has an expected loss of $10. If the e<JUityholders in an all-equity-financed 
corporation discovered that the corporation s mana~rs embarked on such a pro-
ject, they would rightly be upset. However, the equatyholders might change their 
attitude if the corporation were partially financed by debt. Assume the other 
assets of the corporation had a market value of $105 and were riskless, and that 
the corporation had debt outstanding with a face value of $100. If the corpora-
tion rejected the project, the equityholders' stake would be wonh $5. If the cor-
poration accepted the project, then the equityholders would have a two-thirds 
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nancial distress because equity's incentive to accept high-risk 
projects that have a negative expected value is strongest when the 
value of the equity cushion is small and decreases as the equity 
cushion increases. 78 
Conflicts of interest can also lead equityholders to forgo 
projects that would increase corporate value. This can occur if the 
face amount of debt exceeds the debt's market value and the pro-
posed project requires external financing. Under these circum-
stances, the equityholders may not be willing to fund the project 
because some of the benefit goes to the debtholders. This is the 
underinvestment problem. 79 It is also· associated with financial 
distress because the equityholders' reluctance to invest increases 
as the difference between the face and market values of the debt 
increases. 80 
There is a second group of indirect costs. Financial distress 
can interfere with the corporation's .. noncontractual relationships 
with employees, customers and suppliers.81 Because it is impracti-
cal to cover all contingencies with written contracts and impossi-
chance that their shares would be worthless. However, they would also have a 
one-third chance that their shares would be wonh $45. Thus, by undertaking the 
·proposed project, the expected value of the equityholders' stake has risen from 
$5 to $15. The loss, of course, is borne by the debtholders, who see their claim 
fall in value from $100 to $80. This strategy is not only harmful to the 
debtholders, it is also harmful to the corporation and to the economy as a whole, 
because the aggregate value of the corporation falls from $105 to $95. 
78. Set BREALEY &: MYERS, supra note 21, at 441. The above project would 
not be attractive to the equityholders if the corporation's assets were wonh $200, 
for they would then suffer the entire loss if the corporation undenook the 
project. 
79. Stewart C. Myers, DetermiJUJnts ofCt!rporaU .Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. EcoN. 147, 
149-55 ( 1977) [hereinafter Myers, Corporate .Bomnlling]. As an example of the un-
derinvestment problem, consider another corporation that has a bond with a face 
value of$100 outstanding. Given the projects that the corporation has currently 
underway, there is a 50% chance that the corporation will have a value of $80 
when the bond matures and a 50% chance that its value ~1 be $110. The corpo-
ration has a good and safe investment opportunity, an investment of$10 that will 
immediately yield $15. However, the corporation cannot fund the project out of 
its own funds, which are all tied up. If the equityholders fund the project, they 
will see the value of their stock increase by $7.50, from $5 to $12.50, which is less 
than the $10 cost of the investment. Of course, the debtholders gain the other 
$7.50 and the value of their bonds increases ~m $90 to $97.50. New equi-
tyholders will not fund the project either. The only possible purchasers are the 
debtholders, with whom it may be difficult to strike a deal. Indeed, the Trust 
Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. t§ 77a-bbbb (1988), which requires unanimity to 
change the terms of the indenture, creates a severe holdout problem. Although 
debtholders benefit, they cannot coerce recalcitrant debtholders to participate. 
This provides each small debtholder with an incentive to hold out because the 
benefit still accrues if the other debtholders make the investment. 
80. Set BREALEY &: MYERS, supra note 21, at 442. 
81. Ross&: WESTERFIELD, supra note 21, at 455. 
1480 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1461 
ble to cover some, many contingencies are not provided for by 
explicit contracts. Instead, parties perform on the assumption 
that their counterparties will perform. Performing implicit com-
mitments is not naive as long as the counterparty stands to gain 
more by performing than by not performing. Financial distress 
calls into question a counterparty's ability to perform, and there-
fore discourages parties from making new commitments and en-
courages· them to break old ones. 82 For example, if bankruptcy is 
a significant possibility, the corporation's suppliers will be reluc-
tant to commit facilities to servicing a long-term contract and cus-
tomers will be reluctant to purchase durable products from a 
corporation that might not be around to service them. 83 Also, a 
corporation in financial distress can have trouble maintaining key 
employees; worried about their future with the company, they will 
be quick to accept employment elsewhere. 
The little evidence that is available on the magnitude of the 
indirect costs of financial distress confirms the view that they are 
large.84 Edward Altman measured these costs, which include 
those costs related to loss of customers, suppliers and employees 
and the redirection of managerial resources, as the difference be-
tween the corporation's current sales and the product of the cor-
poration's historical fraction of industry sales and current industry 
sales, all multiplied by the corporation's historical profit margin. 
From a sample of nineteen bankruptcies by retail and industrial 
corporations, Altman found that total financial distress costs were 
substantially higher for industrial than for retail corporations. 
82. &e Sheridan Titman, TN Effect of Capilal Structure on a Firm :S LiiJuidatitm 
Decision, 13J. FIN. EcoN. 157, US-59 (1984). There is an extensive literature on 
implicit contncts. &e gmeraUy, Oliver Han 8c Bengt Holmstrom, TM Tlwry of 
Contracts, in ADVANCES IN EcoNOMIC THEoRY (Truman F. Bewley eel., 1987) 
(commenting on implicit contracts' effect on economy). · 
85. For example, many loyal Chrysler customers turned to other automakers 
when Chrysler was threatened with bankruptcy in the 1970s. Ross 8c WESTEil· 
FIELD, SUfml note 21, at 455. 
84. The most widely cited evidence of the indirect costs of financial distress 
is the approximately $2 billion rise in the stock price of Texaco when its bank· 
ruptcy suddenly ended long before expected. &e David M. Cutler 8c Lawrence H. 
Summers, TM Costs of Conflict Resolutitm and Fintmcial Distras: Evidma from 1M Tex-
aco-Pmnzoil Litigation, 19 RANDj. EcoN. 157, 159-64 (1988); Robert H. Mnook.in 
8c Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Mtriet Efficimcy: Uruimlllnding 
Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L REv. 295, 509-10 (1989). This evidence should be 
taken with some caution. First, it is dangerous to draw general conclusions from 
a sample of one. Second, there are indications that Texaco was a potential take-
over target at the time, in which case the rise in price might reflect profits from a 
possible takeover rather than savings from an early depanure from bankruptcy. 
&e DouGLAS G. BAIRD, REVISING AUCTIONS IN CHAPTER II 12 (Chi. L 8c Econ. 
Working Paper No.7, 2d Series, 1992). 
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The total costs of financial distress were 12.1% of corporate value 
five years prior to filing and 16.7% at the time of filing. Altman 
also found that average direct costs were 5% of corporate value 
both at the time of filing and five years prior.85 
C. The Capital Structure Decision 
The causal connection between corporate leverage and finan-
cial distress costs is not just in one direction. Not only does high 
leverage increase expected financial distress costs, but the possi-
bility of incurring these costs encourages many corporations to 
avoid high leYerage.86 Although there is no simple mathematical 
formula for optimal capital structure, the principle is straightfor-
ward. Increasing leverage increases the potential total tax shield. 
However, as leverage increases, two effects offset the interest de-
duction. First, the marginal value of the tax shield falls because 
the probability that the interest deduction cannot be fully used in-
creases. Second, increasing leverage increases the probability that 
the corporation will experience bankruptcy or financial distress, 
thereby raising the corporation's expected financial distress costs. 
85. Edward Altman, A Further Empiricallnwstigatitm of the &nlcTuptcy Cost Ques-
tion, 89 j. FIN. 1067, 1076-88 (1984). 
86. The agency costs imposed by debt also provide corporations and their 
advisors with the incentive to find ways of mitigating these costs through special 
contract provisions. These covenants protect.debtholders from equityholders by 
permitting debtholders to·declare a default if the corporation takes cenain ac-
tions or cenain conditions occur. For example, it is common for covenants in an 
indenture to limit dividends and other transfers to equityholders, to preclude 
additional borrowing beyond a certain level, and to give debtholders a veto over 
cenain extraordinary actions. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &:Jerold B. Warner, On Fi-
Mncial Contmcting: An Analysis of Btmd Covenants, 7 j. FIN. EcoN. 117, ISl-35, 186-
88 (1979). Another means of reducing the costs of conftict are for corporations 
to issue convenible debt. /d. at 141. Convenible debt reduces the incentive for 
firms to pursue asset substitution because convenible debtholders have the right 
to conven their debt claims into stock and share in the transfer of wealth to equi-
tyholders. Id. This reduces the opponunities for existing equityholders to trans-
fer wealth by increasing risk. R1chard C. Green, Jnwstmmt Incmtiws, Debt and 
Wtmtmts, 15 j. FIN. EcoN. 115, 124-29 (1984): Smith&: Warner, supra, at 140-42. 
Another means of reducing confticts is through the issuance of callable bonds, 
which reduce the underinvestment problem, the tendency of levered firms to re-
ject profitable but low-risk projects that primarily benefit debtholders. Smith &: 
Warner, supra, at 142-48. By calling the bonds, the equityholders can limit the 
debtholders' benefit to the call premium. Zvi Bodie &: Roben A. Taggart, Jr., 
FutJm Inwstmmt Opportunitia and tJae Valw of tJae Call Provision on a Bond, 55 J. FIN. 
1187 (1978); janet S. Thatcher, The Choice of Call Provision TtmLS: Evidence of the 
&Utmu of Agency Costs of Debt, 40 j. FIN. 549, 550-51 (1985). The equityholders 
can capture the rest of the gain from undertaking a profitable, low-risk project. 
Bodie&: Taggart, supra, at 1188; Smith&: Warner, supra, at 143; Thatcher, supra, 
at 150-51. These actions, however, are cosdy and only mitigate the cost of con-
fticts, without eliminating them. 
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The corporation achieves its optimal capital structure when the 
additional tax shield benefits equal the additional financial distress 
costs at the margin. Thus, each corporation in the economy has 
an optimal capital structure. 8 7 
How a corporation should set its capital structure is illus-
trated in Figure 1. 88 Figure 1 also shows the potential net gain 
from leverage. The downward sloping line in that figure is the 
expected realizable tax shield on each additional dollar of debt. 
That line, the marginal benefit of additional debt, slopes down-
ward to reflect the increased probability of suspending or losing 
interest deductions as leverage increases. The upward sloping 
line, the marginal cost of debt, is the sum of the extra tax investors 
paid on interest over equity income plus the net expected financial 
distress costs of leverage. This curve slopes up to reflect the in-
creased probability of financial distress and bankruptcy as leverage 
increases.89 The intersection of the two curves represents the op-
timal amount of debt. At this point, the marginal benefit from an 
additional dollar of debt, the present value of the expected tax 
shield, just equals the marginal cost, the sum of the extra tax in-
vestors paid on debt and the increased costs of bankruptcy and 
financial distress. The area enclosed by the marginal benefit and 
marginal cost curves represents the potential gain to the corpora-
tion from an optimal capital structure.90 
87. BREALEY lc MYERS, .sr.1f1RJ note 21, at 431-33. 
88. The diagram is based on one by Stewart Myers. Stewan C. Myers, Tht 
Search for Opliftud Capital Stnldrm, I MIDLAND CoRP. FrN.j. 6, II (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Myers, Opliftud Capital Stnu:ture]. 
89. The cost of using debt instead of equity will include the extra tax paid by 
investors on interest income relative to that paid on ~uity income. Because the 
potential holders of a corporation's securities extend beyond its current securi-
tyholders to investors generally, this portion of the firm's supply curve is 
horizontal. 
In addition, if debt is confined to straight debt, then replacing a dollar of 
debt with a dollar of equity will increase the corporation's payout. If the demand 
for internal financing is fixed, because retained earnings are taxed more favora-
bly than dividends, the corporation should pay a smaller dividend. 
90. The theory of corporate capital structure sketched out in the text is 
called the static trade-off theory because capital structure is determined by bal-
ancing the tax benefits of leverage against the non-tax costs and immediately 
moving to the static optimum. The static trade-off theory is not the only theory 
that has been offered to explain corporate capital structure. Commentators have 
surveyed non-tax theories of corporate capital structure. See, e.g., Milton Harris 
lc Anur Raviv, Till Tlwry of Capital Stnldrm, 46 J. FrN. 297 (1991) (discussing 
various theories of explaining corporate capital structure). 
For sometime financial economists have recognized that capital structure 
changes, because they are responses to changes in the firm's current and ex-
pected condition, can impan information to investors if insiders are privy to in-
formation not available to the market in general. Stephen A. Ross, Tht 
1993] MEAN EFFECI'IVE TOTAL TAX RATES 1483 
The corporate interest deduction encourages corporations to 
Determination of Finmu:ial Strudurt: The lf!Uf&tiw-Signalling .tlpproacl&, 8 BELLj. EcoN. 
23, 27-38 (1977). Such actions are valuable as signals because of the underlying 
conditions they imply. /d. For example, increasing leverage signals an increase 
in expected earnings because if the increased earnings do not materialize, the 
corporation is bankrupt and the management out of work. /d. 
The leading signaling theory of corporate capital structure is the pecking 
order theory. This theory starts with the assumption that managers do not strive 
for optimal financing decisions, but instead follow the path of least resistance. 
According to the pecking order theory, corporations prefer internal financing, 
and they establish their target dividend policy in order to increase the likelihood 
of being able to use internal financing. If external financing is required, corpora-
tions prefer to issue safe securities. Tilat is, they will issue straight debt before 
convertible debt and convertible debt before equity. Stewart Myers and Nicholas 
Majluf have shown that this seemingly illogical theory can follow from rational 
economic behavior when there is asymmetric information, so capital structure 
decisions are useful signals. Stewart C. Myers 8c Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporau 
Financing and lnwstmmt Decisions When Firms Haw lriformation Jnwstors Do Not Haw, 
13 j. FIN. EcoN. 187, 198-210 (1984); S« Harris & Raviv, SUfmJ, at 306-15, 341 
(discussing extensions, criticisms and evidence for this model). This model 
seems to have good predictive power. MAsuus, suJWa note 62, at 90-91. It, how-
ever, is not inconsistent with a richer statement of the trade-off theory, which 
recognizes that firms do not immediately adjust their capital structure to the 
static optimum because of the information content of capital structure decisions 
but that the speed of adjustment depends on the relative costs and benefits of 
. deviations from that optimum. See Edwin 0~ Fischer et. al., Dynamic lApital Struc-
ture Cl&oices: Tl&eory and Tests, 44 J. FIN. 19, 21-33 (1989); Abolhassanjalilvand & 
Robert S. Harris, Corporau Bthavitw in Adjusting to Capital Strudure and Dividend 
Targets: An Ecorurmetric Study, 39 J. FIN. 127, 128-29, l!J9-42 (1984). 
It might be thought that the misallocation of capital within the corporate 
sector identified in this Article depends on the validity of the static trade-off the-
ory of corporate capital structure. However, the rejection of the static trade-off 
theory would not imply the absence of the distortion; it is only under very restric-
tive conditions that the misallocation would not exist. 
First, the capital misallocation still exists with a richer statement of the trade-
off theory. If the shift to an optimal capital structure is not immediate, but the 
speed of adjustment depends on the relative costs and benefits of deviations, 
then the posited distortions will exist, although their magnitude will be less. 
Stewart Myers, the author of both the static tradeoff theory and the pecking order 
theory, and now a leading critic of the former, suggests the latter is incomplete 
without the former. I...AxsHMI SHYAM-SUNDER 8c STEWART MYERS, TESTING STATIC 
TRADE-OFF AGAINST PEcKING ORDER MODELS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 5 n.6 
(Working Paper, 1992). Moreover, the richer trade-off theory introduces a dis-
tortion across corporations. Under the static trade-off theory, the value of a pro-
ject depends on its ability to support leverage, which is largely identical across 
firms. Under richer theories, the debt a project supports can vary across corpora-
tions. Thus, the corporation that finds a project most valuable might not be the 
one for which it has the highest positive net present value, but merely the one 
that is moving most rapidly towards a more levered capital structure. 
Second, the distortion still exists if capital structure is independent of the 
costs and benefits of being away from the optimum. The static trade-off theory 
posits that firm capital structure is a function of certain economic variables. Ac-
cordingly, the theory is wrong if corporate capital structure is a function of other 
economic variables or is independent of such factors. Thus, both the static and 
richer trade-off theories are wrong if capital structure is independent of the pos-
ited economic variables. This suggests not that corporate capital structure is ran-
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make a trade-off when they set capital structure. Corporations 
balance leverage's falling marginal tax shield against increased fi-
nancial distress costs. Existing tax law, thus, encourages corpora-
tions to balance tax savings against increased financial distress 
costs. 
If there were no tax advantage associated with debt, then the 
corporation, in setting its capital structure, would seek to mini-
mize the agency costs of debt and equity.91 However, in the pres-
dom but that the factors that determine capital structure are not those that 
influence the value of leverage. 
A simple demonstration that the distonion still exists if capital structure is 
independent of the variables posited by the static trade-off theory can be given by 
assuming that all firms have the same leverage. Under this assumption, there will 
be differences in the cost of capital between firms (even ignoring differences in 
systematic risk), as long as investors are not consistently fooled by capital struc-
ture and investment decisions are made rationally. Once again, those corpora-
tions that are better able to make use of the interest deductions will have a lower 
cost of capital and therefore a lower hurdle rate for projects. The projects that 
will be favored are still those with low unsystematic risk. Similarly, the cost of 
capital will be higher where the agency costs of debt are higher. Thus, corpora-
tions with high agency costs from debt will have a higher cost of capital and 
projects that impose high agency costs on debt will have high hurdle rates. In 
other words, there will be a bias against high-risk, high-growth projects using 
intangible assets. 
In order to eliminate the capital misallocation, it is not enough for capital 
structure to be independent of the posited economic factors. Instead, the rela-
tionships must be the reverse of those posited by the static trade-off theory. 
There is neither evidence nor theory to suppon such an arrangement. 
Finally, rejecting the static trade-off theory can lead to a decrease or an in-
crease in the magnitude of the misallocation. This is easy to see when capital 
structure is the same for all corporations. Assume all corporations can be di-
vided into two groups: those that the static trade-off theory predicts would have 
low leverage and those that would have high leverage. If all corporations had the 
low leverage capital structure, the predicted low leverage firms would receive 
their maximum benefits from leverage but the predicted high leverage firms 
would achieve less than their optimal benefits from leverage. Because the pre-
dicted high leverage corporations are receiving a smaller advantage, the misallo-
cation would be less than implied by theory. Alternatively, if all corporations had 
the high leverage capital structure, the predicted low leverage firms would re-
ceive less than their optimal benefits. This exaggerates the advantage enjoyed by 
high-leverage firms and increases the misallocation. 
91. Equity imposes agency costs that debt can sometimes mitigate. Pay-
ments to equityholders are discretionary. When these payments are made, man-
agers have fewer resources under their control, reducing their power and 
increasing the probability that they will have to undergo the monitoring of the 
capital markets that occurs when firms raise new capital. Thus, managers have 
an incentive to retain earnings and increase the size of operations past the point 
at which positive net present value projects are available. 
Michael jensen argues that debt can be used to restrain these conflicts. 
Michael C. jensen, lfprcy CAsts of Pm Cash Flow, Cl1rporaU Fifuma and Takeovm, 52 
Ar.c. EcoN. REV. 525, 528-24 (1986). jensen defines free cash flow as the cash 
flow the firm generates in excess of the cash required to fund all positive net 
present value projects. /d. at 525. Debt constrains the conflicts between manag-
ers and investors over free cash flow by taking away managers' control over free 
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ence of a classical tax regime with an interest deduction 
corporations balance the increase in financial distress costs fro~ 
greater leverage against the reduction in taxes.92 Thus, the corpo-
rate interest deduction forces corporations to accept greater finan-
cial distress costs than they otherwise would. Viewed from the 
perspective of the economy, the current tax system is inefficient. 
The tax saving is a transfer from the federal treasury to the corpo-
ration's stakeholders, but the additional financial distress costs are 
real economic costs.95 Thus, the classical two-level tax on corpo-
rate income with a deduction for interest imposes additional finan-
cial distress costs on the economy.94 This is undesirable because 
it reduces national income. 
Ill. IMPACT OF CORPORATE INTEREST DEDUCTION ON INVESTMENT 
The previous section described how corporations set their 
cash flow. Stt id. To spend additional money. the managers must subject their 
plans to the discipline of the capital market. Jd. at 528-24. 
Critics argue that the usefulness of debt as a disciplining mechanism is lim-
ited. Genler Be Hubbard, supra note 50, at 51-55. For example, debt is a poor 
mechanism for inducing managers to bear residual risk for their actions when 
cash flow is highly variable. /d. at 51. 
92. If debt and equity were taxed equally, capital structure would be chosen 
to maximize firm v~lue or equivalently minimize the cost of capital. Leverage 
would, then, depend on the relative financial distress costs of debt and equity. 
However, given the tax advantage to debt provided by current law, the capital 
structure that minimizes total financial distress costs is not optimal. Conse-
quently, at the margin, corporations balance the tax advantage of debt against 
increased financial distress costs. Thus, corporate leverage would be lower, but 
not necessarily zero, if debt and equity were taxed equaUy. 
98. Returning to Figure 1. the upper line, the expected realizable tax shield, 
slopes down because as leverage increases the likelihood that deductions will be 
suspended or lost increases, thereby decreasing the value of the marginal deduc-
tion. This curve represents a transfer payment from the government to the cor-
poration. The lower line in Figure I is the sum of the extra tax paid by investors 
on interest over equity income plus the net expected bankruptcy and financial 
distress costs of leverage. The former is horizontal, independent of the firm's 
leverage, because the additional investor-level tax on interest depends on the 
marginal taxpayer's tax bracket, which is not affected by the financial policies of 
any single firm. (This assumes that interest paying debt replaces an equivalent 
amount of dividends, so that there is no additional investor-level tax.) The latter 
slopes up, reflecting the increased probability of financial distress and bank-
ruptcy from additional leverage. Once again, the former is a transfer payment 
between the government and the corporation. The latter, however, is not. The 
bankruptcy and financial distress costs are real resource costs incurred by the 
corporation. 
94. Roger H. Gordon Be Bunon G. Malkiel, Corpomtitm FiruJ11£t, in How 
TAXES AFFEcr EcoNOMIC BEHAVIOR 181. 172 (Henry Aaron &joseph Pechman 
eds., 1981) (estimating that welfare loss from encouraging debt over equity was 
$8.2 billion in 1975). Their estimate amounts to about .24% of consumption and 
about .2,0 of gross national product. GRAVELLE, SUfWa note 20, at 25. 
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target debt-to-equity ratios. Essentially, they balance the tax ad-
vantages of debt against the costs of financial distress. When 
these two are equal at the margin, the corporation has achieved its 
optimal debt-to-equity ratio. If all corporations saw the value of 
their interest tax shields decline and financial distress costs rise at 
the same rate when leverage increased, they would all have the 
same debt-to-equity ratio and they would all e.Yoy the same bene-
fit from leverage. However, by virtue of their different activities, 
the rate at which interest tax shields decline and financial distress 
costs increase with leverage varies across corporations. Conse-
quently, corporations have different capital structures; therefore, 
some corporations benefit more than others from the lower tax on 
debt. 
This section argues that because of the preferential tax treat-
ment of corporate debt, capital will be drawn into corporations 
with high debt capacities and away from corporations with low 
debt capacities. It also argues that this misallocation is harmful to 
the economy because it diverts investment away from valuable 
projects that cannot support a lot of debt to less valuable projects 
that can support more debt. 
According to a 1991 report written by Jane Gravelle and is-
sued by the Congressional Research Service, the total effective 
federal income tax on corporate equity is 42%, taking into ac-
count both shareholder and corporate level taxes. 95 Gravelle fur-
ther estimates that the total effective federal income tax on 
corporate debt is minw 10%.96 Using these values, the following 
example illustrates how the classical corporate income tax with an 
95. The number is derived &om a simulation. It assumes a rate of inflation 
of 4%, a 57% dividend payout rate, an average holding period of seven years, 
that two-thirds of capital gains are de(erred until death and that SO% of assets 
are held by tax-exempt entities. GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 8-9. 
96. /d. at 10. The negative corporate tax rate on debt, which means that 
debt is subsidized by the tax system, arises because corporations can deduct both 
the real interest rate and the inflation premium and because borrowers' tax rates 
generally exceed those of lenders. /d. 
97. Merck, one of the leaders in the pharmaceutical industry, has virtually 
no debt. BREALEY & Mnas, supra note 21, at424-25. 
98. Because this example concentrates on the effect of taxes, not risk, the 
project is assumed to have no systematic risk. In the language of finance, beta () 
ts zero. This assumption simplifies the exposition because the after-tax required 
return on equity is independent of leverage. However, the distortion from the 
interest deduction does not d~d upon the assumption. S. BREALEY & MYERS, 
supra note 21, at405-07 (descnbing Modigliani-Miller Theorem 11--expected re-
turn on equity oflevered firm increases in proportion to debt-equity ratio); Ross 
& WESTERnELD, supra note 21, at 425-27 (same). 
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interest deduction misallocates capital through its impact on the 
cost of capital. 
Assume that corporations in the pharmaceutical industry have 
no debt because of high financial distress costs.97 These corpora-
99. The value 1!.79% is calculated as follows: 8%/(1 - .42). 
100. The value 10.53% is calculated as follows: .5 x 8%/(1 - (-.1)) + .5 
X 8%/(1 - .42). The two .5s represent the fraction of the firm's capital in debt 
and equity. 
10 1. The proper means of capital budgeting is to use the net present value 
(NPV) rule. This rule requires that future cash flows of a proposed project be 
estimated and then discounted using a discount rate appropriate for the project's 
risk. The initial investment is then subtracted from the present value of the fu-
ture cash flows. If the difference, the NPV, is positive, the project should be 
accepted, and conversely. The NPV rule is the proper technique for capital 
budgeting, because it reduces to accepting a project if it increases net worth, and 
conversely. BREALEY Be MYERS, supra note 21, at ch. 2; Ross Be WESTERnELD, supra 
note 21, at ch. 5. 
The internal rate of return (IRR) rule requires that the future cash flows be 
estimated. The IRR is the rate of return for which the NPV is zero. The IRR rule 
calls for the project to be accepted if the IRR exceeds the hurdle rate, the mini-
mally acceptable rate of return, and conversely. Under normal circumstances, 
the two rules produce identical results. However, under other circumstances, the 
IRR rule yields misleading results, whereas the NPV rule always produces the 
correct result. BREALEY Be MYERS, supra note 21, ch. 4; Ross Be WESTERnELD, 
supra note 21, at ch. 6. 
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tions, which have many opportunities for profitable investment, 
want to avoid the asset substitution and underinvestment 
problems. They also want to avoid bankruptcy because it would 
be costly to take a pharmaceutical company through bankruptcy. 
These corporations use little tangible capital, relying heavily on 
the accumulated knowledge of their employees who develop and 
market new drugs. If the employees' jobs are not secure, they will 
leave. Assume that corporations in the cement industry have a 
debt-to-equity ratio of one-to-one. They have more leverage than 
corporations in the phannaceutical industry because debt imposes 
lower financial distress costs. There are few opportunities for as-
set substitution or underinvestment in the cement industry be-
cause the major asset, the plant, is committed to cement 
production. In addition, if a cement producer goes bankrupt, it is 
easy for another producer to takeover the plant because cement 
plants are very similar.9s 
Assume further that the after-tax rate of return required by 
investors in both debt and equity is 8%, that the effective total 
federal income tax rate on equity is 42% and on debt is minus 
10%. This implies that the cost of capital to pharmaceutical com-
panies is 13.79%,99 whereas the cost of capital to cement compa-
nies is only 10.53%.100 A finn's cost of capital is the pre-tax 
return it must earn to cover the required after-tax return of its 
investors. The cost of capital is sometimes referred to as the hur-
dle rate for investments because a firm will increase the value of its 
outstanding securities if it selects projects with a return exceeding 
its cost of capital and it will decrease the value of its securities if it 
selects projects with a lower return.IoJ 
Because the investment policy that maximizes the finn's value 
is to undertake all projects that have an expected rate of return 
above its cost of capital but to refuse all projects that have an ex-
pected return below its cost of capital, the pharmaceutical com-
pany will only invest in projects with an expected return above 
13.79%. However, the cement company will pursue projects 
above its hurdle rate of 10.53%. 
Assume that there are two S 1 million projects under consider-
ation. A pharmaceutical company is considering investing in a 
new drug and estimates that the project would return 13%, and a 
cement company is considering a new plant, which it estimates 
would yield 11%. (Both estimates are before any taxes.) From the 
perspective of maximizing domestic wealth, an investment in the 
new drug is preferable to an investment in a new cement plant. 
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However, the investment in a new cement plant will occur because 
its 11% return exceeds the cement company's 10.53% hurdle 
rate, whereas the investment in the new drug will be rejected be-
cause its 13% return is below the pharmaceutical company's 
13.79% hurdle rate. 
The reason for this result is the much higher tax burden im-
posed on the pharmaceutical company's project. Because the 
drug company cannot support the new project with debt but in-
stead must use equity, the investment in a new drug is, in effect, 
subject to a higher tax rate. 102 The income from the drug invest-
ment is effectively subject to a 42% combined corporate and per-
sonal tax rate, whereas the investment in a new cement plant is 
subject to an effective total tax rate of 24%. 105 
More genen.lly, as the amount of debt in the capital structure 
increases, the corporation's effective total tax rate and cost of capi-
tal decline. The effective total tax rate approaches minus 10% and 
the cost of capital approaches 7.27% as ·leverage approaches 
100%. Because there are fewer projects with an expected return 
above 13.79% than with an expected return above 10.53%, or 
7.27%, the classical corporate tax discourages investment in cor-
porations with low leverage and encourages investment in corpo-
rations with high leverage. lOt 
Differences in the cost of capital lead to a misallocation of 
capital within the corporate sector. Projects with a large debt ca-
pacity have a lower hurdle rate than projects with a small capacity. 
Thus, some of the latter are foregone whereas the former with 
lower rates of return are undertaken. As a consequence, too many 
resources will be invested in projects that can support a lot of debt 
and too few resources in projects that cannot support as much 
debt. 105 Expressed in slightly different language, the existing 
102. The example suggests that one way for corporations to respond to the 
tax advantages of debt is to increase their leverage. However, the discussions of 
excess tax shields and financial distress in the previous section showed that not 
all corporations can increase their leverage as easily. Corporations for which lev-
erage as expensive will have less debt and higher capital costs. These corpora-
tions will have to be more selective in approving investment projects. 
lOS. The 24% effective total tax rate is calculated as follows: (10.58% -
8%)/10.58%. 
104. The difference in the cost of capital is an approximate measure of the 
difference in the true cost of investment. It ignores the declining value of the tax 
shield and the costs of financial distress. The exact measure is given as in Figure 
I. Unfonunately, there are no simple methods for measuring the marginal bene-
fit and marginal cost curves. 
105. In general, corporations that are unlikely to have excess losses and will 
suffer only small declines in value in the event of bankruptcy or financial distress 
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classical corporate tax with an interest deduction taxes projects in 
inverse proportion to their capacity for debt. The harm from this 
effect is that it causes some projects to be adopted that have a 
lower pre-tax net present value than some of the projects it causes 
to be turned down. By reducing the return on investment, this 
effect makes the nation poorer and reduces its rate of income 
growth. 
How important are these differences in rates of return 
brought about by distortions? Before dismissing the differences 
as small and therefore insignificant, it is important to recall the 
effect of compound interest. The difference between accumula-
tion at 8% and at 10% is only 2% per year. However, $1 invested 
over a period of twenty years with annual reinvestment grows to 
only $4.66 at 8%. but it reaches $6.73 at 10%, a 44% difference in 
accumulated value. This difference continues to grow as the rein-
vestment horizon increases. 106 Thus, differences in hurdle rates 
for investment in different sectors, brought about by the tax-fa-
vored treatment of debt, can over time result in large differences 
in value.l07 Moreover, the differences are pure social gains that 
can result from shifting investment at the margin from tax-ad-
vantaged projects to tax-disadvantaged projects. 
A second reason to believe that the difference is important is 
provided by a study from Mervyn King and Don Fullerton on the 
taxation of income from capital and economic growth.•08 King 
and Fullerton conclude that the variance in tax rates throughout 
the economy across investments, and not the average level of tax 
will have more leverage than corporations that are likely to have excess losses 
and will suffer large declines in value when they experience bankruptcy or finan-
cial distress. Expressing this result in terms of Figure 1, the size of the enclosed 
region will differ across corporations. How large the potential gain from corpo-
rate borrowing is will depend on the factors previously described: the probability 
of being able to use the mterest deduction and the loss in value that would result 
from financial distress or bankruptcy. Depending on these factors, a corporation 
will have a large or a small potential gain from leverage. If its potential gain is 
large relative to that of other corporations, and the corporation takes advantage 
of the opportunity by issuing nearly the optimal amount of debt, then it will re-
ceive an advantage through the interest deduction. Alternatively, if its potential 
gain is small, then it will be disadvantaged by the interest deduction. 
106. Mter 50 years, the accumulated value is 150% greater with the higher 
rate ofretum. The investment is worth $46.90 at 8% compared with $117.59 at 
10%. 
107. See David F. Bradford,/ssiiiS in till Design of Savings and lnwslmmllnun-
tiws, in DEPRECIATION, INFLATION, AND 1;HE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 
15, 25 (Charles R. Hulten ed., 1981). 
108. See MERVYN A. KING Be DoN Fuu..ERTON, THE TAXATION oF INcoME 
FROM CAPITAL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KING-
DOM, SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY (1984). 
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rates, is most closely related to low growth rates.I09 Although the 
distortion identified in this Article is not the only difference in ef-
fective tax rates in the U.S. economy, if King and Fullerton are 
correct in their conclusion, then eliminating such distortions is 
likely to have a high payoff. 
IV. DISADVANTAGED ACTIVITIES 
The corporate tax literature has long recognized the advan-
tage afforded debt over equity financing. 110 Although corpora-
tions might be legally free to set any capital structure (at least 
before providing restrictive covenants), they are not economically 
free. There are significant economic constraints on capital struc-
ture. Moreover, and most important, the constraints are not the 
same for all corporations. Accordingly, those corporations that 
can best take advantage of the differential tax treatment will bene-
fit the most. Thus, the harm from the differential treatment of 
various kinds of corporate financings is not that some forms of 
financing are encouraged over other forms but that corporate ac-
tivities are encouraged or discouraged based on their affinity for 
d._ifferent kinds of financing. 
A. Ec07Winic Variables Affecting Debt Capacity 
The argument that capital structure decisions are influenced 
by economic considerations, such as federal income tax and bank-
ruptcy laws, risk, growth prospects and asset nature; suggests that 
corporations within an industry should have similar capital struc-
tures. Studies of industry capital structure patterns confirm this 
result. 111 The nature of the projects that cannot support a lot of 
109. /d. at S02 (noting that Britain has high variance in tax rates and low 
growth while Gennany has low variance in tax rate and high growth). 
110. Su, '·f·• William D. Andrews, Tax Nlfllrality Ihtwlm Equity arul Dlbt Capi-
ttJl, SO WAYNE L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1984). Recently, the literature has recognized 
that the advantages are not all one way and commentators have become more 
concerned with how the tax law encourages and discourages various forms of 
financing. William Andrews, for example, has criticized existing tax law because 
it encourages both debt financing over equity financing and retained earnings 
over dividend payments accompanied by new issues. /d. at 1058-64. However, 
Andrews does not explain why 1t matters if debt is favored over equity. Douglas 
A. Kahn, Commmts on "Tax NIUtrtJlity Jhtwlm Equity CapittJl arul Debt", SO WAYNE L. 
REV. 1081, 1081-82 (1984) (suggesting that Andrews should explain why favor-
ing debt over equity is problematic). This Article explains the significance or 
consequences of favoring debt over equity. 
Ill. Several studies have found that there is more variation in mean firm 
leverage ratios across industries than within industries. Su M.uuus, supra note 
62, at 81. For a discussion of evidence that 6rm leverage ratios tend to cluster 
within an industry, see id. at 21-22 (citing CYNTHIA CAMPBELL, INDUSTRY LEVER-
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debt, and are therefore discouraged by the tax law's favoring debt 
over equity, are described below. 
I. High-Risk Projects Discouraged 
The corporate interest deduction discourages investment in 
high-risk projects.l 12 This occurs because a. corporation's debt ca-
pacity is inversely related to risk, measured by the variance of the 
corporation's total returns. Risk discourages leverage in two ways. 
First, at any given debt level, the larger the variance in earnings, 
the greater the probability that the corporation will not have a tax 
liability in a given year. Thus, risk increases the rate at which the 
tax shield declines as leverage increases. Second, at any given 
debt level, the larger the variance in earnings, the more likely it is 
that the corporation will be bankrupt or in financial distress and 
suffer the associated costs.••s Thus, increased risk raises the fi-
nancial distress costs of leverage. Expressed in terms of Figure 1, 
increased risk shifts the marginal benefit curve down and the mar-
ginal cost curve up, reducing the optimal amount of leverage. Ac-
cordingly, the riskier the corporation, the higher its cost of 
capital. 114 
AGE REGULAilmES: OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCI'URES OR NEUTRAL MUTATIONs? (Uni-
versity of Michigan Working Paper, 1986)). Cynthia Campbell tested the joint 
hypotheses that optimal capital structures exist for corporations and that some of 
major determinants of optimal leverage are industry-related. CAMPBELL, sufm!.. 
Campbell reports that there is a strong positive reaction in the corporation's 
stock price when it adjusts its leverage towards the industry mean and a negative 
reaction when it moves away. /d. 
112. The claim that the corporate interest deduction discourages invest-
ment in high-risk projects is based on a comparison of the existing tax system to 
one without the interest deduction but with a lower corporate tax rate, so that the 
net tax revenue is the same, and which is otherwise identical to the current sys-
tem. The comparison is not between the current tax system and a no-tax world. 
Because of the numerous distortions created by the existing tax system, that com-
parison would be extremely difficult to make. 
liS. Firms that employ certain production technologies and produce certain 
products are associated with greater earnings variability than are other firms. 
MAsuus, supra note 62, at SI. Under reasonable conditions this will lead to a 
greater risk of bankruptcy. /d. However, the relationship between earnings vari-
ability and firm bankruptcy rates has not been documented. /d. at !2. 
114. Evidence that firm volatility is invenely related to leverage is mixed. 
Michael Bradley, Gregg jarrell and E. Han Kim found a strong negative relation-
ship between leverage and firm-specific risk. Michael Bradley et al., On till Exist-
ence of an Optimal Capital Structrm: Theory tmd Evidence, 39 J. FJN. 857, 87!-74 
(1984). In contrast, Michael Long and Ileen Malitz found a significant positive 
relationship between firm-specific risk and leverage. Michael S. Long Be Ileen B. 
Malitz, lnwstmmt Ptztlems tmd Firumci41 i..nJmJp, in CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUC· 
TURES IN THE UNITED STATES !25, 526 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 1985) In a 
third study, Sheridan Titman and Roberto Wessels found a negative relationship 
between leverage and firm-specific risk, but the coefficient was not significant. 
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Among two projects with the same before-tax net present 
value, the riskier project will not support as much debt. Conse-
quently, because the effective tax rate on the riskier project will 
exceed that on the less risky project, the riskier project will yield a 
lower after-tax return. Thus, the corporate interest deduction 
causes U.S. corporations to undertake more low-risk projects and 
fewer high-risk projects than they might otherwise undertake. 
There are additional distortiops from the corporate interest 
deduction because of the bias against risk. The deduction encour-
ages corporations to diversify. Other things being equal, a diversi-
fied corporation has less earnings variance. Consequently, a 
diversified corporation can employ more leverage and have a 
lower cost of capital. 115 · 
By encouraging corporations to diversify, the corporate inter-
est deduction spurs conglomerate mergers. 116 When two corpo-
rations whose returns are not strongly correlated merge, they will 
reduce the variation in their total returns. This increases their 
debt capacity, thereby reducing their combined taxes and lower-
ing their cost of capital. The tax savings from a conglomerate 
l!lerger can induce corporations to merge that otherwise would 
not. In effect, such corporations are trading economic inefficien-
cies for tax savings. Thus, the corporate interest deduction en-
courages inefficient conglomerate mergers. 117 This reduces 
Sheridan Titman Be Roberto Wessels, The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice, 43 
J. FIN. 1, 11-15 (1988). The evidence is compiled and discussed by Ronald Masu-
lis, who concluded that "[s]upport is found for leverage being negatively influ-
enced by the total risk of the firm's assets." MAsuus, supra note 62, at 90. The 
argument that volatility is inversely related to leverage is based on the assump-
tion that bankruptcy costs are not trivial. Volatility is a proxy for the probability 
of bankruptcy. Evidence on the relationship between leverage and the 
probability of bankruptcy was collected by Richard Castanias, who found that 
industry bankruptcy rates maintain stability over time and that firms in industries 
with higher bankruptcy rates tend to have lower leverage ratios. Richard Cas-
tanias, &nlrruptcy Rislr and Dpti'IIUJI Capillll Structure, !8J. FIN. 1617, 1629 (1983). 
115. See SAMAN MAJD Be STEWART C. MYERS, VALUING mE GovERNMENT's 
TAX CLAIM ON RISKY CoRPORATE AssETS 22 (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search Working Paper No. 1553, 1985) (noting that undiversified firms are at 
significant tax disadvantage, especially for high-risk assets). 
116. Without the corporate interest deduction, there would still be a tax-
driven incentive to merge because of incomplete-loss offsets. /d. at 17-22. How-
ever, the incentives would be weaker without the deduction. 
117. Whether greater concentration in the form of conglomerate mergers 
encourages or discourages innovation and the welfare ·implications of these ef-
fects are the subject of much debate. See DENNIS W. CARLTON Be jEFFREY M. 
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 20 (1990); SCHERER 8c Ross, 
supra note 17, at ch. 17 (citing other relevant works and discussing the effects of 
greater concentration). There is a rich economic literature on how market struc-
ture affects RileD spending that can be traced to joseph Schumpeter. See josEPH 
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national income. 
In addition, the corporate interest deduction gives a con-
glomerate an advantage over a small corporation in pursuing a 
project.118 Between two corporations, other things being equal, 
the more diversified corporation can support more debt, so it will 
have a lower cost of capital for the project. As a consequence, the 
corporation undertaking a project might not be the most efficient, 
but merely the one with the largest tax advantage. 
2. Growth Projects Discouraged 
The corporate interest deduction discourages investment in 
projects with opportunities for further profitable investment. The 
market value of a corporation is the market value of its assets in 
place plus the market value of its future growth opportunities. 
What is crucial about the latter is that it depends on future discre-
tionary investment. 119 These opportunities can be of any kind. As 
examples, Stewart Myers lists advertising, incorporating new tech-
nologies, improving efficiency, and recruiting and training 
employees. 120 
Because of the underinvestment problem, increased leverage 
reduces the likelihood that future profitable investments will be 
made. Accordingly, corporations with good investment prospects 
avoid leverage, which translates into a high effective tax rate and 
therefore a high cost of capital. As a consequence, some high-
growth investments will be passed over in favor of low-growth in-
vestments.l21 Thus, the corporate interest deduction diverts capi-
ScHuMPETER, CAPITAUSM, SociAusM AND DEMOCRACY (1942). Schumpeter ar-
gued that monopolistic firms would set inefficiently high prices but would inno-
vate faster because of better access to capital, superior risk poolinJ. and 
economies of scale in RBcD. /d. at 106. Critics argue that the greater flexibility of 
small outfits is more conducive to R&:D than the bureaucracies of large 
organizations. 
118. The corporate loss limitations also have these effects. MAJD &: MYERS, 
supra note 115, at 20-21 (demonstrating effects of loss-offsets on risk-taking); 
Mark Campisano &: Roberta Romano, R«rrllffing Losses: The Cau for FuU Loss Off-
sets, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 709, 722-50 (1981) (same);j.E. Stiglitz, The Eff«ts of In-
come, Wtallh, and C/Jpi14l Gains Taxalilm on Rislr-Tding, 85 QJ. EcoN. 265, 275-79 
(1969) (same). 
119. In the language of finance, the opponunity is an option that expires 
without being exercised if the necessary investment is not later made. 
120. Myers, Ct1rJ1orate ~. mpra note 79, at 156 (noting continual ef-
fons towards these activities requiring discretionary investment). 
121. Corporations with numerous investment possibilities are also more 
susceptible to the asset substitution problem. Because low leverage reduces the 
opponunity for asset substitution, these corporations have an additional reason 
to avoid leverage. This reinforces the effect described in the text. 
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tal away from projects with growth opportunities towards projects 
that rely more heavily on assets in place.•22 
3. Investment in Intangible Assets Discouraged 
The corporate interest deduction discourages investment in 
assets that lose value sharply in times of bankruptcy or financial 
distress. Stewart Myers argues that the loss in value is greatest for 
intangible assets that are linked to the firm as a going concem.•2s 
The examples that he gives are advertising, technology, research 
and development (R&D), and human capital.l24 Sheridan Titman 
argues that the loss of value is directly related to asset uniqueness 
and offers similar examples.•25 
Corporations that use intangible and unique assets avoid lev-
erage because of the high costs of financial distress. Accordingly, 
they have a high effective total tax rate and a high cost of capital. 
This discourages investment in activities that employ intangible or 
unique assets.126 
122. The only study to test the hypothesis that growth is inversely related to 
leverage found the hypothesized negative relation, although it was not statisti-
cally significant. Titman Be Wessels, supm note 114, at 11-15. 
12S. Myers, OptirtUJI Capital Structure, sujmJ note 88, at 12-15. See gmeraUy 
George Mundstock, Tamtion of Business Intangible Cajlital, IS5 U. PA. L. REv. 1179 
(1987) (discussing taxation of corporate intangible assets). 
124. Myers, OptirtUJI Cajlital Structure, supra note 88, at 12-15. Bronwyn Hall 
has documented the negative correlation between corporate leverage ratios and 
R&D. BRONWYN H. HALL, INVESTMENT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE 
FIRM LEVEL: DoES THE SouRCE OF FINANCING MATrER? I, 24 tbU (National Bu-
reau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4096, 1992). 
125. Titman, supra note 82, at 1S7; Titman Be Wessels, supm note 114, at 5. 
126. There is evidence supporting the inverse relationship between leverage 
and the reliance on intangible assets. Michael Long and Ileen Malitz found a 
positive relationship between capital expenditures and leverage. Michael S. 
Long Be Ileen B. Malitz, The Investment-Financing Nexw: Some Empirical Evidence, S 
MIDLAND CoRP. FIN. j. 5S, 57-59 (1985) (hereinafter Long 8c Malitz, /nveslmmi-
Financing Nexw]. Because capital expenditure is a proxy for tangible capital, 
Long and Malitz interpret this finding as support for the hypothesized negative 
relationship between intangible assets and leverage. /d. Further support for this 
position comes from a study by Michael Bradley, Gregg jarrell and E. Han Kim, 
who found a negative relationship between advertising and R&D expenditures 
and leverage. Bradley et al., supm note 114, at 875-76. Sheridan Titman and 
Roberto Wessels found a positive but insignificant relationship between tangible 
assets and leverage. Titman Be Wessels, supm note 114, at 11-15. They did, how-
ever, find a statistically significant inverse relationship between asset uniqueness 
and leverage. /d. 
The difficulty in finding a strong relationship between intangible assets and 
leverage is probably a result of the importance of nondebt tax shields. Harry 
DeAngelo and Ronald Masulis observed that nondebt tax shields, such as depre-
ciation, depletion allowances, foreign and investment tax credits, influence the 
demand for debt. DeAngelo Be Masulis, supm note 61, at 12-19. As long as ex-
cess tax shields are difficult to transfer, firms with nondebt tax shields that are 
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B. The Nature of the Bias 
The biases against growth, risk-taking and intangible assets 
translate into biases against high-tech industries. emerging tech-
nologies. innovative production and management practices and 
long-term noncontractual relations. 
Although there are no commonly accepted principles for 
characterizing high-tech industries. "[t]hese industries are said to 
make significant use of scientific. engineering. and other technical 
personnel and to invest in a greater than average level of R&D 
funding ... 127 Thus. one characteristic of high-tech industries is 
their heavy use of intangible capital. which cannot support a lot of 
debt because it tends to depreciate rapidly when the corporation is 
in financial distress. In addition, many high-tech goods have short 
product life cycles. For example, the average product life cycle 
for dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips is mree 
years. 128 Short product life cycles suggest numerous growth op-
portunities and high risk. Competitive pressures, to innovate dis-
courage leverage because leverage increases the opportunities for 
asset substitution and underinvestment. A corollary of the com-
petitive pressures to innovate is that failures sometimes occur. 
which suggests that the industries are risky. Thus. because the 
factors identified here as discouraged by the corporate interest de-
duction-high-risk. good growth prospects and use of intangible 
assets-are characteristic of high-tech industries, the corporate in-
terest deduction discourages investment in such industries. 
The corporate interest deduction also discourages investment 
in emerging technologies and new production techniques. By def-
inition. these are growth opportunities that cannot support much 
debt. They also rely heavily on intangible assets, although they 
might or might not be very risky. Finally. the corporate interest 
deduction discourages investment in noncontractual long-term 
large relative to expected earnings before interest and taxes wiD issue less debt. 
/d. One implication of DeAngelo and Masulis' result is that it suggests that capi-
tal structure consideration~ mitigate but do not eliminate the income-nature--as 
opposed to the consumption-nature--of the federal corporate income tax. The 
disadvantage that results from not being able to take currendy a full deduction 
for certain expenditures but being required to depreciate or even defer the re-
covery until disposition is the reduction in the present value of deductions. 
Thus, expected income before interest and taxes is larger when expenditures 
cannot be currendy deducted. This increases the corporation's capacity for debt, 
which can partly compensate for the reduced value of deferred deductions. Su 
genmUiy Edwardj. McCaffery, Tt»C Policy Undlra H1brid Iru:om~-Consumptilm Tt»C, 70 
TEX. L. REv. 1145 (1992) (discussing income/consumption tax debate). 
127. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 235 (1989). 
128. /d. at 237. 
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understandings between the firm and its employees, suppliers and 
consumers. 129 
V. THE CASE FOR REMEDYING THE DISTORTION 
Because any tax other than a head tax creates distortions,uo 
the mere identification of a distortion cannot justify its removal. ut 
Because the market will still remain distorted if the identified dis-
tortion is remedied, the question becomes will reform increase the 
total distortion imposed by the entire tax system. 152 Unfortu-
nately, as long as there are other distortions, the general theory of 
the second best implies that it is always theoreticaUy possible for the 
total distortion to increase or decrease when a single distortion is 
removed. Thus, absent a thorough empirical study of the entire 
economy, there is no absolute answer. Because ohhe tremendous 
difficulty and expense of such studies, especially the trouble in 
conducting predictive studies of potential law reform, requiring 
them would place a nearly impossible burden on the proponents 
of change. Accordingly, in the tax literature, it is common for pro-
129. Such long-term understandings are at the heart of the Japanese 
.. Keiretsu, a system of interlocking banks and industrial companies. See Ronald j. 
Gilson Be Markj. Roe, Unllerstanding tlwjapanese Keiretsu: Overlaps &tween Corporate 
Govmuma and Jndwtrilll Organization, 102 YALE LJ. 871, 882•95 (199S). It is fur-
ther worth noting that the six key similarities the MIT Commission on Industrial 
Productivity finds among best-practice firms, and which it recommends other 
firms adopt, are unlikely to support a lot of leverage. These six similarities are: 
simultaneous improvement in quality, cost and delivery; closer customer links; 
closer supplier links; using technology for strategic advantage; more flexible or-
ganization structure; and innovative human resource policies. DERTOuzous ET 
AL., supra note 19, at ch. 9. The existing tax law, thus, discourages firms from 
adopting these best-practice techniques. 
Although not widely accepted, Lawrence Summers and Andrei Shleifer posit 
that takeover gains are a redistribution from "stakeholders" to equityholders. See 
KRuGMAN, supra note 15, at 159-61. "Stakeholders" are those other than stock-
holders who have made a long-term commitment to the firm. /d. at 160. Sum-
mers and Shleifer argue that these gains are pan of a long-term understanding, 
which will be harder to build up in the future. /d. at 160-61. Viewed from this 
perspective, the tax advantage of debt increases the incentive for owners to break 
these understandings. 
ISO. RICHARD MusGRAVE Be PEGGY MusGRAVE, Puauc FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 279 (5th ed. 1989). 
lSI. Kahn, supra note 110, at 1081 (stating that "the elimination ofa distor-
tion in a specific area is not a sufficient justification for a proposed change in the 
tax law"); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Eifo:ienc1 and lncrnne Tax.es: Tlw ReluJbilitation 
of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REv. 97S, 975 (1986) (discussing "propriety of tax 
incentives in the federal income tax and the use of economic analysis to examine 
questions of concern to academic lawyers"). 
1!2. The total distortion imposed by taxes, also called the excess burden or 
dead-weight loss, measures the loss imposed by taxes from interfering with eco-
nomic decisions and distorting choices. MusGRAVE Be MusGRAVE, supra note 150, 
at 277-80. 
1498 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. SS: p. 1461 
ponents of reform to argue that a distortion biases choice in a way 
that is undesirable, that it creates problems of sufficient magni-
tude to warrant attention, and that it is not likely to interfere with 
another choice in a way that will create a large distortion. 155 Fur-
thermore, a good tax system must be built on normative as well as 
efficiency values. 154 In this section, I argue that the tax treatments 
of debt and equity should be equalized. Having argued above that 
choice is biased in an undesirable way, I tum to estimating the 
magnitude of the distortion before presenting the argument that a 
remedy is likely to cause more good than harm. 
A. Measuring the Capital Misallocation 
Michael Long and Ileen Malitz have calculated debt-to-capital 
ratios, the face amount of corporate debt as a percentage of in-
vested capital,155 on an industry-by-industry basis.•56 Although 
such accounting measures of debt-to-capital ratios are only prox-
ies for actual debt-to-value ratios, these measures provide an idea 
of the magnitude of the bias across industries from the tax law's 
favorable treatment of corporate debt.l57 
Long and Malitz identified sixty-three industries classified by 
four digit Standard Industrial Codes (SIC). 158 Because many of 
the industries consisted of only a few firms, they reduced their 
sample to thirty-nine industries, each with at least eight firms. 159 
Long and Malitz found a mean debt-to-capital ratio in the econ-
omy of22.4%;140 The five industries with the lowest leverage and 
the mean debt-to-capital ratio in these five industries are as fol-
lows: cosmetics and toiletries (9%); drugs (10.9%); photographic 
US. See Kahn, supra note 110, at 1081-82 (commenting on proposal to elim-
inate distortion). 
U4. MusGRAVE Be MusGRAVE, supra note 150, at ch. U; see also Andrews, 
supra note 110, at 1058-59 (discussing relationship between taxation of equity 
capital and debt). 
U5. Invested capital is calculated as the book value of long-term debt and 
equity plus capitalized R&D spending and advertising. 
U6. Long Be Malitz,/nvestmmt-Fmancing NtDtUS, sufmJ note 126, at 56-57. 
157. It is standard practice to use book value in studies of this son. See, e.g., 
Titman Be Wessels, supra note 114, at 7 (noting that data limitations require use of 
book value). Robert Bowman has shown that the correlation between the book 
and market value of debt is very large. Roben G. Bowman, Tlte l'lft/Hirl4nu of a 
MtZTket-Palue MltiSUmttml of Debt in Assessing Lewroge, 18 j. AcCT. RES. 242 (1980) 
(discussing relationship between market risk and financial and accounting 
variables). 
158. Long Be Malitz,/nvestmmt-FiMncing NtDtUS, sufmJ note 126, at 56-57. 
U9. /d. 
140. /d. at 57 tbl.2. 
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equipment (11.2%); aircraft (13.4%); and radio and television re-
ceiving (14.2%).141 . The five indust?es with the highest leverage 
are petroleum refinmg (29.4%); textde mill products (30.8%); pa-
per and allied products (32.2%); blast furnaces and steel (33.7%); 
and hydraulic cement (44.1 %).142 
To get a rough estimate of the bias, I employed Gravelle's 
estimate that the effective total federal income tax rate on corpo-
rate equity is 42% and on corporate debt is minus 10% and as-
sumed an after-tax rate of return of 8%. Treating Long and 
Malitz's debt-to-capital ratio as an estimate of the actual debt-to-
value ratio, the mean effective total tax rate for U.S. corporations 
in the Long and Malitz sample is 30.35%. For the cosmetic and 
toiletries industry, the effective total tax rate would be 37.32%, 
whereas for the hydraulic cement industry it would be 19.07%. 
Thus, this back-of-the-envelope estimate of the bias introduced by 
the interest deduction is that the effective total tax rate on the cos-
metic and toiletries industry is nearly double that on the hydraulic 
cement indus tty. 
Table I provides estimates of the effective total tax rate for 
the ten industries described above.145 
The leverage figures reponed by Long and Malitz are ten 
years old.144 Since that time, aggregate debt-to-equity ratios for 
U.S. corporations have increased substantially. 145 According to 
John Shoven and joel Waldfogel, by 1986, the book value aggre-
gate debt-to-capital tatio for U.S. corporations was 27.3%.146 As-
141. /d. at tbUt Among 258 U.S. manufacturing industries in 1977, drugs, 
aircraft and photographic equipment ranked first, third and fifth based on the 
ratio of R&D to sales. SCHERER & Ross, supro. note 17, at 615-16 (citing FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, STATISTICAL REPORT: ANNUAL LINE OF BUSINESS REPORT 21 
(1977)). This provides anecdotal suppon for the claim, more thoroughly docu-
mented by Bronwyn Hall, that R&D does not suppon a lot of debt. Su BRONWYN 
H. HAu., CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT HORIZONS 6-15 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5794, 1991). 
142. Long & Malitz, Investmmt-Finanang N~XUS, supra note 126, at 57 tbl.5. 
145. I did not calculate costs of capital for the various industries because an 
industry's cost of capital is a function not only of its effective total tax rate but 
also of its systematic risk. Su BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 21, at 161-65 (dis-
cussing relationship between systematic risk and cost of capital); Ross & WESTER· 
nELD, supra note 21, at 504-07; su also BuRTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK 
DoWN WALL STREET ch. 9 & 10 (5th ed. 1990) (providing non-technical discus-
sion of relationship between systematic risk and cost of capital). 
144. Long & Malitz, Investmmt-Finandng N~XUS, supro. note 126, at 157-59 
(publishing figures in 1985). 
145. john B. Shoven & joel Waldfogel, Introduction and Summary, in DEBT, 
TAXEs, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING I, 7-10 (John B. Shoven &joel Waldfo-
gel eds., 1990). 
146. /d. at 8. 
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TABLE I 
MEAN EFFECTIVE TOTAL TAX RATEs FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
Industry Name 
Cosmetics 
Drugs 
Photographic Equipment 
Aircraft 
Radio and TV Receiving 
Petroleum Refining 
Textile Mill Products 
Paper 8c Allied Products 
Blast Furnaces 8c Steel 
Hydraulic Cement 
Economy Wide 
Leverage 
9.0 
10.9 
11.2 
13.4 
14.2 
29.4 
30.8 
32.2 
33.7 
44.1 
22.4 
Total Effective 
Tax Rate 
37.32 
36.33 
36.18 
35.03 
34.62 
26.71 
25.98 
25.26 
24.48 
19.07 
30.35 
Table I assumes an effective total tax on debt of minus I 0% and an effective total 
tax on equity of 42%. 
suming Shoven and Waldfogel's numbers are comparable to Long 
and Malitz's, this would suggest an increase in the cost from the 
lost interest deductions to corporations that eschew leverage. 
This is especially likely to be true if the increase in leverage was 
not uniform across industries but was greatest for those industries 
with relatively high leverage. 
The bias across industries understates the biases against 
growth, risk and intangible assets. Staid industries contain some 
dynamic firms, and dynamic industries contain some staid firms. 147 
A single industry debt-to-capital ratio averages across all firms in 
an industry, lumping staid and dynamic firms together.l48 For a 
corporation with no debt, such as Merck, the effective total tax 
rate would be 42%, which exceeds the mean effective total tax rate 
by 11.65%. For a corporation with a debt-to-value ratio of 80%, 
the effective total tax rate would be .40%, which is nearly 30% 
below the mean. 
147. At a glance, the pharmaceutical companies listed in Yalue Lin~: show that 
finns that perfonn a lot ofR&:D have little debt, and convenely. I am indebted to 
my colleague, jeff Strnad, for this observation and for the argument that ftows from it. 
148. There is more variation in capital structure across finns than across 
industries. For a discussion of this variation, see supra note Ill and accompany-ing text. 
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. Mic~ael Long .and lleen Malitz sort their sample of 549 corpo-
rau?ns m~o quartdes based on leverage. 149 The mean debt-to-
capital rataos a.nd corresponding mean effective total tax rates for 
the f~ur q~artiles, arranged from least to most highly leveraged, 
are g~ven m Table II. Table II demonstrates that looking across 
TABLE II 
MEAN EFFECTIVE ToTAL TAX RATEs FOR U.S. CoRPORATIONS, 
BY QUARTILE 
Mean Total 
Quartile Leverage Effective Tax Rate 
1 9.18 37.23 
2 19.94 31.63 
3 29.12 26.86 
4 42.83 19.73 
Table II assumes an effective total tax on debt of minus 10% and an effective 
total tax on equity of 42%. Corporations are ranked according to leverage. 
quartiles of corporations in the U.S. economy, there is wide varia-
tion in effective total tax rates as a result of the differential treat-
ment of debt and equity. This strongly suggests that the 
differential tax treatment produces a large capital misallocation. 
Arguably, the measured bias across corporations also under-
states the actual bias. For even the dullest corporations have some 
vowth opponunities and some assets that will lose value in bank-
ruptcy, and the most dynamic corporations have some dull assets 
that can suppon a lot of leverage. 
B. Second Best and Other Considerations•5o 
The corporate interest deduction misallocates capital, thereby 
reducing national wealth, because some projects are pursued with 
expected returns below those of other projects that are rejected. 
One school of thought in tax policy believes that whenever a dis-
tonion is found it should be eliminated. The weight of current 
149. Long&: Malitz, Investment-Financing Nt!X.W, supra note 126, at 58 tbl.4. 
150. My claim is neither that the corporate interest deduction accounts for 
declining U.S. competitiveness nor that eliminating the bias from the deduction 
would end that decline. My claim is only that the corporate interest deduction 
discourages investment in innovation and risk-taking and that equalizing the 
treatment of corporate debt and equity would encourage investment in these 
areas, eliminating that distortion. 
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scholarly opinion, however, is more reluctant to act. These au-
thors, wary of second-best problems, require more than a showing 
of a distortion to justify its elimination.151 
Although there is widespread agreement that the (relative) 
competitiveness of U.S. corporations has declined substantially 
since the end of the second world war, agreement ends there. 
There is substantial debate over the causes of this decline, 
whether the causes are benign or indicative of deeply-rooted infir-
mities in the U.S. economy, whether the decline will stop at parity 
or continue, and what, if anything, should be the response.1s2 For 
those who believe that reversing declining U.S. competitiveness is 
the overriding economic imperative, the case fo~ remedying the 
distortion is strong. For these people, any countervailing consid-
erations from remedying the bias are dominated by the need to 
encourage investment in new technologies and organizational 
practices. However, even for the more skeptical, there are reasons 
to believe that the harm from the capital misallocation is large and 
that the benefit from eliminating it will exceed the costs. 15s 
Because of the general theory of the second best, theory 
alone cannot provide a definite answer to the question of whether 
placing debt and equity on par will reduce the total distortion fos-
tered by the tax law. This Article identifies three ways in which the 
corporate interest deduction biases investment. However, in none 
of these three ways is the existing tax law without bias. In each 
instance, there are provisions in the law tending to cause biases 
both in favor and against such investment. The bias against risk-
151. SM, e.g., Kahn, mpra note 110, at 1081-82 (suggesting caution in elimi-
nating distonions because eliminating one distonion may create other distor-
tions and discussing propriety of tax incentives in federal income tax and use of 
economic analysis to examine questions of concern to academic lawyers). 
152. The literature is voluminous and beyond the scope of this Anicle to 
review. &1, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTuRY ch. 
13 (1993) (discussing reasons for United States economic decline and possible 
remedies); KEVIN PHILUPS, BolLING POINT: REPUBUCANS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE 
0ECUNE OF MIDDLE-ClASS PltOSPERnY 171-75 (1993) (discussing decline in rela-
tive competitiveness of U.S. corporations and its effect on U.S. middle-class). 
153. Comparisons with other countries are difficult. Although the United 
States is practically alone in providing no tax relief on dividends and retained 
earnings, leverage ratios for nonfinancial corporations are higher in Germany 
and japan than in the United States. SM Eli Remolona, Uruilrsl4ruling lntemaiUnuzl 
Differences in 1..erJerap Tmtds, FRBNY Q, llEv. 31, 32 tbl.l (Spring 1990). How-
ever, unlike in the United States, where financial institutions are prohibited by 
law from panicipating in the management of the firm, the financial institutions 
that supply debt to German and Japanese businesses frequently panicipate in 
their management. Gertler Be Hubbard, SUf1rG note 50, at 54. Financial econo-
mists believe that this panicipation tends to mitigate the aFcy problems from 
debt. /d. at 53-56 (discussing harm from capital misaUocabon). 
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taking is reinforced by incomplete-loss offsets;•s. the bias is offset 
by limited liability155 and the realization requirement, which al-
low~ taxpayers to accelera.te d~uctions and defer inclusions by 
selbng loss assets and holdmg gam assets. 15& The implementation 
of a capital tax can operate in either direction. 157 The bias against 
growth investments is reinforced by a tax system that captures ac-
cretions, even if they do not produce increases in net pres.ent 
value;158 this bias is offset by the realization requirement that per-
mits gain on appreciated propeny to escape tax until the gain is 
realized. 159 The bias against investment in intangible assets is re-
inforced by the nondeductibility of most educational expenses•so 
and the prohibition against depreciating propeny with an indefi-
nite life, such as goodwill; 161 this bias is offset by the immediate 
deductibility of many of the expenses that are used to produce 
intangible assets, such as wages and training costs.•s2 
Looking beyond the three biases, there is reason to believe 
that eliminating the differential treatment of debt and equity will 
not create another large distonion, although it will cure one.•ss 
As the reader might recall, one effect of the favorable treatment of 
debt is to encourage corporations to take on more debt as they 
balance . the tax savings from debt against increased agency 
costs. 164 Because the former is a transfer payment and the latter a 
154. Stiglitz, supra note 118, at 275-79; sn also MAJD Be MYERS, supra note 
115, at 20-21 (discussing how tax asymmetries impact after-tax net present value 
of projects); Campisano Be Romano, supra note 118, at 722-SO (discussing treat-
ment of net operating losses and its effect on risk taking). 
155. Without limited liability, there would be no asset substitution. Thus, 
limited liability encourages risk taking. 
156. George Constantinides, Co.Jlital Mtrrlut Equilibrium With Penonal Tax, 51 
ECONOMETRJCIA 611, 6SS-S4 (198S). 
157. SN joseph Bankman Be Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Betwem an Income 
Tax and a Cmuumption Tax A Debate About Rislc7 Does it Matter7, 47 TAX L. REv. S77, 
S9S-95 (1992); Manin S. Feldstein, The Effects ofTDXIltion on Risk Taking, 77 j. PoL. 
EcoN. 755, 761-64 (1969); see also Stiglitz, supra note 118, at 270-74 (analyzing 
after tax income assuming full loss offset). 
158. jeff Strnad, TDXIltion of Income from Capital: A Theorrtical Reappraisal, S 7 
STAN. L. REV. 102S, 107S (1985). 
159. SN jEFF STRNAD, TAX DEPRECIATION AND RISK 64-7S (California lnstit. 
of Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. 765, 1991); William A. Klein, Timing in 
Pemmal TQXtJtion, 6 j. LEGAL STUD. 461, 46S (1977). 
160. Paul B. Stephen III, Fedmd Income TDX4tion and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. 
REv. 1!57, 1S75 (1984). 
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(l)(b) (1988). 
162. SN Stephen, supra note 160, at IS68 (discussing concept of human capi-
tal as it relates to federal income tax system). 
16S. Because of the complex interactions, one cannot be sure of the former. 
164. For a further discussion of the favorable tax treatment of debt, see 
supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. 
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real cost, the differential treatment of debt and equity wastes re-
sources. Hence, eliminating that differential will cure the bias and 
end the waste. 
The close relationship between technological advance and 
real income growth provides additional support for eliminating 
the differential tax treatment. There are two links in the chain: 
the first link is between technological advance and productivity 
growth; the second is between productivity growth and income 
growth. The latter is obvious;165 the former is not. 
The argument that economic growth is fueled by technologi-
cal advance was put forth by joseph Schumpeter at the tum of the 
century.a66 Schumpeter argued that the accumulation of capital 
was not th~ principal engine of economic growth, but rather entre-
preneurship and innovation were the driving forces. For fifty 
years, this bold thesis was met with skepticism, not only by Marx-
ists, who viewed capitalism as the accumulation of capital and 
therefore, might be expected to be critical, but also by mainstream 
economists schooled in the static view of the marginalist revolu-
tion. Schumpeter's argument continued to be questioned until 
Robert Solow provided evidence confirming Schumpeter's thesis. 
In the 1950s, Solow set out to measure how much of the 
1. 79% average annual increase in U.S. nonfarm labor productivity 
that occurred in the first half of this century was due to increased 
capital intensity. Consistent with Schumpeter's thesis, Solow 
found that less than 20% of the increase was due to capital ac-
cumulation, the remainder being attributable to improved produc-
tion practices and a more highly skilled labor force.l67 In 1985, 
following Solow, Edward Denison calculated that only 13% of the 
growth in worker productivity between 1929 and 1982 was due to 
increased capital intensity. Denison concluded that 34%. of the 
growth was due to improved worker education and 68% to im-
proved technology.l68 Although scholars have quibbled over the 
numbers, the conclusion is clear: U.S. income growth has over-
165. See PAUL KRuGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED ExPECTATIONS ch. I 
(1990). 
166. jOSEPH SCHUMPETU, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (19!4) 
(first published in Germany, 1911). 
167. Robert Solow,. TeclmoiDifical Clump and the Aggregate Production Function, 
!9 REV. ECON. Be STAT. !12 (195?'). 
168. FREDERICK ScHERER Be DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 61! (!d ed. 1990) (citin' EDWARD F. DENISON, 
TRENDS IN AMERICAN GROW'lll, 1929-82 50 (1982)). Demson's percentages total 
more than 100% because some factors, such as reduced hours worked, decreased 
productivity. 
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whelmingly come from increasingly skilled workers applying new 
and better technology.l69 The same holds true for the other in-
dustrialized nations. 170 Thus, the important role that technologi-
cal advance plays in fueling economic growth supports remedying 
the capital misallocation caused by the corporate interest 
deduction. 171 
The argument for eliminating the differential treatment of 
debt and equity is strengthened by studies showing that, at least 
for major technological advances, only a small portion of the ben-
efit is captured by the innovator, the remainder going to imitators 
and other competitors, upstream and downstream producers, and 
consumers. 172 Thus, the differential tax treatment, by discourag-
ing innovative activity, is discouraging activities that produce large 
external benefits.I75 Given such benefits, the social costs of dis-
couraging these activities through the tax laws could be stagger-
169. EDWARD F. DENISON, WHY GRoWTH RATEs DltFER: POS1WAR ExPERI-
ENCE IN NINE WESTERN CouNTRIES 297-SOO (1967) (discussing sources of eco-
nomic growth in U.S.); see also ScHERER & Ross, supra note 168, ;at 61!-14 
(discussing reasons for increase in U.S. income). 
170. ScHERER & Ross, supra note 168, at 614; see generally LANDES, supra note 
.12 (discussing relationship between technological change and economic develop-
ment over last two centuries in Western Europe); NATHAN RosENBERG & L.E. 
BIRDZELL, jR., How THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL WoRLD ch. 8 (1986) (discussing reasons for increase in United 
States and Western European incomes during late 19th and early 20th centuries). 
171. There are also non-economic reasons for concern over the capital dis-
tonion. International differences in the ability to develop and apply state-of-the-
an technology are an important determinant of the balance of military power. 
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 168, at 614. In addition, it is widely acknowledged 
that political and military power depend ultimately on economic productivity. 
DERTOUZOUS ET AL., supra note 19, at 2. 
172. Set, e.g., Timothy Bresnahan, Measuring the Spil/ovm from Technical .tld-
vmu:e: Mai'fljraftte Com.puten in Financial Smlias, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 742, 75S ( 1986) 
(noting that social benefit equals 1.5 to 2 orders of magnitude above invention 
cost); Zvi Griliches, Research Expmdilum, Education and the .tlggrrgau Agricultural 
Production Frmction, 54 AM. EcoN. REv. 961, 964-71 (1964) (noting that social re-
turn from agricultural research at least 1.5 times greater than private return); 
Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return From Jndwtriallnnovalitms, 
91 QJ. EcoN. 221, 2SS (1977) (noting that for 17 major products innovations, 
social return exceeded private return by between 77% and 150%). For a survey 
of these and other studies, see Edwin Mansfield, Intell«tual p,pmy Rights, Techno-
logical Change and Economic Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERlY RIGHTS AND CAPI-
TAL MARKET FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE ch. I (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. 
Bloomfield eds., 1988). I am indebted to Rob Merges for directing me to these 
sources. 
17S. Levelling the tax treatment cannot make up for the externalities. How-
ever, if the activities discouraged by the corporate interest deduction are gener-
ally of the kind that produce large external benefits, then a case could be made 
for revening the existing tax treatment to encourage, as opposed to merely not 
discouraging, high-growth, high-risk activities that employ intangible assets. 
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ing, and are likely to exceed any offsetting second-best effects. 17• 
Absent a detailed prospective empirical study, it is not possi-
ble to be certain whether eliminating the differential treatment of 
corporate debt and equity will improve welfare. However, there 
are good reasons to believe that eliminating the differential will 
produce signmcant improvements in welfare. 
VI. PROPOSALS TO EUMINATE FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF DEBT 
This section reviews several possible solutions to the misallo-
cation of capital within the corporate sector. These possible solu-
tions include, among others, full-loss offsets for corporations, the 
elimination of the corporate interest deduction and corporate 
integration. 
A. Full-Loss Offiets 
It might be thought that the misallocation of capital described 
in this Anicle is derivative of the misallocation caused by incom-
plete-loss offsets for corporations. Although the two problems are 
related, neither one encompasses the other. Accordingly, a sys-
tem of full-loss offsets, such as that proposed by Mark Campisano 
and Roberta Romano, 175 would be only partially effective in reme-
dying the distortion caused by the corporate interest deduction. It 
would reduce, not eliminate, the disincentive to invest in high-risk 
projects, but it would have no significant effect on the disincentive 
to invest in growth projects employing intangible assets. 
In contrast with existing tax law, under full-loss offsets the 
government would provide a refund to a corporation with nega-
·tive taxable income. Thus, with a flat S4% federal corporate in-
174. The debate over industrial policy, sometimes referred to as picking 
winners and losers, comes down to the extent to which the economic benefits of 
technological and managerial improvements can be internalized by firms that de-
veloP. them and the extent to which the government will get mired down in poli-
tics 1f it pursues an industrial policy. Critics of industrial policy disparage the 
ability of government bureaucracies to do a better job than entrepreneurs and 
investors and fear the possibility of government largesse being distributed on the 
basis of political clout, not economic merit. The winners that everyone is search-
ing for are high-growth companies. The winners might also be risky companies 
that are good bets. However, risky companies and growth companies are disad-
vantaged by the tax law because of their low debt capacity. The proposal ad-
vanced in this Article is to eliminate the higher tax burden on risky ventures and 
growth opponunities. 1bis would encourage investment in these activities while 
still permitting the market, as opposed to the government, to determine which 
projects are funded and which are not. 
175. Campisano Be Romano, supra note 118, at 709. 
1993] 
MEAN EFFECTIVE ToTAL TAX RATEs 1507 
come t~ and full-loss offsets, a corporation that had a $10 million 
net loss m 1992 would receive a $3.4 million refund. 
Proponents of full-loss offsets point to the detrimental effect 
on risk taking that the current system of incomplete-loss offsets 
has. Because the tax system provides only a partial deduction for 
loss.es, risky_ projects are taxed more heavily than are less risky 
proJects, With the result that too few risky projects are 
undertaken.176 
A system of full-loss offsets would ameliorate but not elimi- · 
nate the bias against risky investments. Investment in risky 
projects is discouraged because corporations are taxed more heav-
ily if they cannot use their interest deductions currendy. Thus, 
giving corporations the right to use these deductions would elimi-
nate the costs associated with carrying losses forward and possibly 
seeing them expire. Risky firms also avoid debt because of the 
associated financial distress costs. Full-loss offsets would not re-
duce this incentive for risky firms to eschew leverage.t77 There-
fore, full-loss offsets would not elimipate the bias against risky 
investments identified in this Article. 
Furthermore, full-loss offsets would not ameliorate the tax 
law's biases against investment in growth projects and intangible 
property. Growth industries and industries that intensively use in-
tangible property employ litde debt not because they cannot use 
the interest deductions but because bankruptcy and financial dis-
tress are cosdy. 
These results can be illustrated with Figure 1. Full-loss off-
sets can only cure the bias introduced by the differential declining 
value of tax shields; that is, full-loss offsets can straighten out the 
marginal benefit curve. Full-loss offsets cannot ameliorate the 
bias from differential financial distress costs because it has no ef-
176. MAJD Be MYERS, supra note 115, at 20-21; Campisano Be Romano, supra 
note 118, at 722-SO; see Clifford Smith et al., Finaru:itd EngiR«nng: Why Hedger, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 129-!2 (Clifford Smith Be charles 
Smithson eds., 1990) (providing lucid illustration). 
177. Although full-loss offsets would reduce the bias against risk taking, this 
comes at a cost in real resources. By increasing the value of the expected interest 
tax shield, a system of full-loss offsets would encourage firms to use more lever-
age. Firms will, therefore, incur greater expected financial distress costs, which 
are real resource costs to society, when they balance these costs against the 
greater expected tax savings. The welfare effect of implementing a system of 
full-loss offsets depends on whether the benefits of improved risk bearing exceed 
the financial distress costs of additional leverage. If, however, full-loss offsets are 
implemented and the interest deduction is simultaneously eliminated, there is no 
trade-off, only the improved risk-bearing occurs. 
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feet on the marginal cost curve.t7s 
B. Elimination of Corporate Interest Deduction 
Eliminating the corporate interest deduction would remedy 
the bias against investments in risky growth projects employing 
intangible assets. Because that action, by itself, would raise corpo-
rate tax revenues, the federal government could simultaneously 
eliminate the corporate interest deduction and reduce the corpo-
rate tax rate from the current 34%,179 without reducing corporate 
tax revenues.180 Of course, eliminating the corporate interest de-
duction and reducing the statutory corporate tax rate would not 
remedy the misallocation of capital between corporate and 
noncorporate sectors; investment in the corporate form would still 
be discouraged. 1st 
Furthermore, although the proposal would eliminate the tax-
induced incentive to issue debt, because interest would no longer 
be deductible, it would not remove tax considerations from the 
capital structure decision. Eliminating the corporate interest de-
duction, while maintaining the tax advantages of equity-the 
deferral of investor-level tax on retained earnings-would en-
courage corporations to issue equity.182 A means of eliminating 
the resulting advantage from retained earnings would be to tax 
equity investors on their portion of a corporation's retained earn-
ings and give them a basis adjustment in their stock. Taking these 
actions would place debt.and equity, as well as dividends andre-
178. Similarly, eliminating the tax advantage of debt would not eliminate 
the bias against risk taking introduced by incomplete-loss offsets, but it would 
reduce it. 
179. Because the corporate income tax is highly distortionary, it is a poor 
vehicle for raising additional revenue through a tax hike. For a discussion of the 
corporate income tax's distortionary effect, see infra note 191 and accompanying 
text. 
180. Presenting the reform as revenue neutral isolates the impact ofrestruc· 
turing the corporate tax from the effect of raising or lowering taxes on 
corporations. 
181. The argument presented in this Article, that the corporate interest de-
duction misallocates capital, does not apply to individual taxpayers and pass-
through entities, such as partnerships, because income earned by individuals and 
pass-through entities is subject to only one level of tax. Thus, there can be a 
deduction for interest paid by individuals, whether for business or investment 
reasons or, more generally, even if there is not a corporate interest deduction, 
without creating problems of the kind described here. 
182. One implication of encouraging corporations to issue equity rather 
than debt is that It would encourage investment in growth companies because 
they can put retained earnings to good use. Furthermore, it would encourage 
corporations to retain capital for unproductive investments and would increase 
the cost of using debt to discipline management. 
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tained earnings, on par, thereby removing tax considerations from 
the capital structure decision. 
As~uming th~t the bias agai~st investment in the corporate 
form wdl not be Simultaneously eliminated by integrating the cor-
porate and personal tax systems, a possibility which is taken up 
next, a strong case can be made in favor of the proposed changes: 
eliminate the corporate interest deduction, lower corporate tax 
rates, and tax equityholders on their allocated share of retained 
earnings while providing them with a basis adjustment.•ss By 
equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity, the proposed 
changes would have two advantages. First, the changes would 
eliminate the waste that results from the tendency to encourage 
corporations to balance reduced taxes against increased financial 
distress costs.•s• Second, the changes would eliminate the misal-
location of capital within the corporate sector.l85 Such changes 
are likely to improve welfare. 186 If any biases that should be elimi-
nated remain after implementing the proposed changes, it would 
ISS. Edward Kleinbard proposes replacing the corporate interest deduction 
with a cost of capital allowance (COCA), which would pennit a corporation a 
.. deduction equal to the product of its invested capital and a statutory. COCA. 
COCA would be a fixed fraction of the cost of capital, and invested capital would 
be the adjusted tax bases of the corporation's assets. Edward D. Kleinbard, Be-
yond Good and Evil Dtbt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allt1wanct System, 67 
TAXEs 94S, 957 (1989); su also Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Dmvatiw Products: 
Finmu:it;U lnflt1Vation :S NewtSt Claallmgt to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REv. IS19, 1S6S-
68 (1991) (discussing implementation of COCA deduction). A similar proposal 
was advanced by the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Set INsTmrrE FOR FISCAL STUD-
IES, EQ.UITY FOR CoMPANIES: A CoRPORATION TAX FOR THE 1990's (Fourth Report 
of the Institute for Fiscal Studies Capital Taxes Group, Commentary No. 26, 
London, 1991). Like the proposal to eliminate the interest deduction and reduce 
corporate taxes, COCA would eliminate the interest deduction. However, to 
compensate for the loss of the interest deduction, it would not lower corporate 
tax rates but would instead provide a deduction for all of the capital used in the 
business. Consideration of this complex and intriguing proposal for refonn must 
wait for another opportunity. 
There are several problems with COCA as an alternative to the corporate 
income tax without an interest deduction. First, COCA, by reducing taxable in-
come, would exacerbate the disincentive to invest in risky projects caused by in-
complete-loss offsets. Second, the higher tax rate under COCA implies a larger 
distortion from the corporate tax. 
184. For a discussion of the waste that results from the tendency to en-
courage corporations to balance reduced taxes against increased financial dis-
tress costs, see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
185. By eliminating the misallocation, it would also increase corporate in-
vestment in risky projects and growth opportunities, which most commentators 
would applaud. 
186. Because of the general theory of the second best, the previous conclu-
sion cannot be stated categorically. For a discussion of the effects of such 
changes on the general welfare of the country, see sutmJ notes IS0-1M and ac-
companying text. 
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be desirable to eradicate such biases by amending the tax law in a 
manner that does not waste real resources. 187 
C. CtnfJO'rtJU Integration 
The Treasury Department (Treasury) recently released a 
long-awaited and lengthy (24 7 pages) study of corporate integra-
tion.188 The idea behind corporate integration is to eliminate the 
double taxation of corporate earnings, which discourages busi-
nesses from using the corporate form and reduces investment in 
activities that can best be done in that form. 189 In addition to sub-
jecting corporate income to only a single level of tax, thereby plac-
ing it on par with noncorporate investments, corporate integration 
is also intended to eliminate the distortion between debt and eq-
uity finance.J90 
187. Ultimately, the dift'erential treatment of corporate debt and equity is 
not likely to be desirable. It would be more efficient to correct any biases that 
might possiblyjustify the dift'erential treatment with direct taxes and so avoid the 
waste the trade-oft' produces. 
188. TREASURY DEP'T REPORT, sufmJ note 44. 
189. The interaction between taxation and the choice of business form is 
formally modelled by jane G. Gravelle 8c Laurence Kotlikoft', Tlu Jncillmce and 
E.J/identy Costs of Corporau Tamtion WAm Ctlrptlrau aflll Ntmeflf'/JOrau Firms Prodwe the 
Same Goods, 97 j. PoL. EcoN. 749 (1989). 
190. A normative argument for taxing debt more heavily than equity might 
be based on limited liability, which numerous commentators have critically 
viewed as an inappropriate subsidy that permits corporations to externalize risk. 
Set, '·I· , Henry Hansmann 8c Reinier Kraakman, TIIU/Qrd Unlimilld Shtmholdlr Lia-
bility for CArptwuu Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879, 1882-8S (199l);jonathan M. Landers, 
A Unified Approach to Parmt, Subsilliary and AJ/iliale Qrustions in &nllrupky, 42 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 589, 619-20 (1975). Financial economists have recognized that limited 
liability can be viewed as a put option on the firm's assets with an exercise price 
equal to the outstanding debt, the value of which (other things being equal) in-
creases with the variance of earnings. Ross 8c WESTEilFIELD, sufmJ note 21, at 
627, 6S7. Consequently, because debt capacity decreases with risk, the tax bur-
den is directly related to the limited liability subsidy. Thus, the argument goes, 
because the higher tax counteracts the limited liability subsidy, the dift'erential 
treatment of debt and equity should not be eliminated. 
The difficulty with the above justification is that it ignores the harmful conse-
quences from the lower tax on debt that are unrelated to the limited liability 
subsidy: the waste in real resources and discouraging investment in growth 
projects and intangible assets. Furthermore, because limited liability is a subsidy 
only to the extent that risk can be externalized and many voluntary creditors, 
especially debtholders, protect themselves through higher interest rates, the cor· 
relation between risk and the value of the subsidy across firms is imperfect and 
might be weak. See Richard A. Posner, Tlat Rights of Crwlitors of Ajfilit.IUd Corpora· 
tion.s, 4S U. CHI. L. REv. 499, 501-05 (1976). 
Another possible argument in favor of the corporate interest deduction anal-
ogizes corporate and individual taxpayers. The personal deduction for interest 
paid on business debts ensures an accurate measure of taxable income. To illus-
trate, consider an individual with an opponunity to receive $1000 next year by 
investing $800 today. If the individual invests $800, the individual will realize 
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. ~cc~rding ~o ja~e Gravelle, the double tax on corporate eq-
uity 1s h•ghly d1storuonary. She estimates that every additional 
dollar of tax collected through the federal corporate income tax is 
accompanied by throwing away between $.50 and $1 in distor-
tions.l91 Accordingly, integration has become a crusade among 
tax policy specialists, producing a lengthy literature on corporate 
integration, to which this Article cannot do justice. My more mod-
est goal is to address the extent to which the various integration 
proposals respond to the capital misallocation described in this 
Article.I92 
I. Prototypes Examined in the Treasury DtpartmenJ Study 
The Treasury's corporate integration study outlines three op-
tions for restructuring the corporate tax system. The most exten-
sive restructuring option is the Comprehensive Business Income 
Tax (CBIT). Under CBIT, shareholders and bondholders exclude 
dividends and interest from income, but neither payment is de-
ductible by the corporation. Thus, CBIT taxes all corporate earn-
ings at the corporate level. Treasury views CBIT as a long-term 
comprehensive means of equalizing the tax treatments of corpo-
rate and noncorporate investments as well as debt and equity.195 
Treasury considers the dividend exclusion prototype, which 
would eliminate the personal-level tax on dividends, the easiest 
restructuring option to implement. Corporations would continue 
to pay tax on their after-interest earnings. Investors would be 
taxed on interest received but not on dividends. Thus, the divi-
$200 profit, which the government will tax. If the individual only has $400 to 
invest and takes in a panner with whom the individual will split the profits, then 
each panner will realize a profit of $100, which the government will tax. Sup-
pose that instead of taking a panner, the investor borrows $400, agreeing to 
repay $500. This leaves the investor with a profit of$100 and the lender with a 
profit of $100. Without the interest deduction, the investor's profit would be 
$200 and the total taxable profit would be $500. Thus, without a personal de-
duction for interest on business loans, income would be overstated for tax pur-
poses and the financing decisions of noncorporate entities would be biased in 
favor of equity over debt. 
The above argument does not extend to the corporate tax because corpora-
tions are taxed as separate entities, which results in a double tax on corporate 
equity but a single tax on corporate debt. Accordingly, the corporate interest 
deduction turns debt into a device for reducing tax, thereby influencing corpo-
rate financing decisions. 
191. GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 22-50. 
192. This Anicle only considers the most basic of the integration proposals 
under the simplest of circumstances. A fuller treatment incorporating integra-
tion complexities, such as treatment of tax-exempt shareholders and effects of 
various withholding regimes must wait for another day. 
195. TREASURY 0EP'T REPORT, supra note 44, at !9. 
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dend exclusion prototype taxes the investor on interest and the 
corporation on dividends and retained earnings. The Treasury 
currently favors the dividend exclusion prototype.194 
Under the third restructuring option, shareholder allocation, 
shareholders would include allocated amounts in taxable income, 
receive a credit for corporate taxes paid, and increase the basis in 
their shares by the income allocated. Distributions would be 
treated as a return of capital to the extent of basis and, thereafter, 
as capital gain.195 In contrast to CBIT, which eliminated the tax 
disparity between debt and equity by taxing the income from both 
at the corporate level, the shareholder allocation prototype has 
the effect of taxing debt and equity income at the shareholder-
level.196 
2. E.lfoctiveness of Different Prototypes in Eliminating Investment Bias 
The various integration proposals are not equally effective in 
eliminating the biases introduced by the corporate interest deduc-
tion. Although the tax law's tendency to discourage high-risk, 
high-growth projects that use intangible property can be elimi-
nated by putting debt and equity on a par, that tendency is re-
duced, but not eliminated, when the tax treatment of equity is 
improved, compensating for its disadvantage inside the corpora-
tion, by reducing the investor-level tax. 
Of the three prototype restructuring options studied by the 
Treasury, only CBIT would eliminate the subsidy on debt and 
therefore remove the bias against high-risk, high-growth projects 
using intangible assets. CBIT eliminates the bias because neither 
interest nor dividends are deductible. In addition, CBIT does not 
permit corporations to avoid taxes by issuing equity and retaining 
earnings because neither dividends nor interest are includible by 
the recipient. This effect can be illustrated using Figure I. The 
194. /d. at 15. 
195. A founh prototype, the shareholder credit prototype, is discussed in 
the section on roads not taken. This prototype was recommended in AMERICAN 
I..J.w INSTITUTE, REPORTER's STUDY or CoRPORATE TAX INTEGRAnoN (March 81, 
1998) (Alvin C. Warn:n,jr., reponer). It is also the dominant form of integration 
abroad. Under the American Law Institute's shareholder credit proposal, share· 
holders, when they receive a dividend, include the dividend plus the corporate-
level tax in income and receive a credit against personal-level taxes for corporate 
taxes paid. If the corporate tax exceeds the investor's tax rate, the excess credit 
can be used to shelter other income. Thus, the shareholder credit prototype 
taxes all corporate earnings at the individual level. 
196. Although the shareholder allocation prototype effectively taxes corpo· 
rate income at the investor level, it does not eliminate the corporate-level tax. 
Instead, it uses the corporate tax as a withholding tax. 
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downward-sloping marginal tax shield schedule is shifted down to 
the horizontal axis because the corporate-level tax advantage from 
debt is eliminated by CBIT. Similarly, that portion of the upward-
sloping marginal cost schedule that represents the investor-level 
tax advantage from equity is also coincident with the horizontal 
axis. Thus, the capital structure decision is a function only of ex-
pected financial distress costs, so that corporate value is maxi-
mized by choosing the capital structure that minimizes these costs. 
Encouraging managers to set capital structure to minimize ex-
pected financial distress costs is efficient and socially desirable. 
Such action would eliminate two disadvantages of the current tax 
system. First, setting capital structure to minimize expected finan-
cial distress costs eliminates the waste incurred when managers 
balance tax savings against increased financial distress costs. Be-
cause the former are transfer payments but the latter are real 
costs, the current law encourages managers to make such a bal-
ance. In this way, the current law reduces national wealth. Sec-
ond, setting capital structure to minimize expected financial 
distress costs eliminates the misallocation of capital that arises be-
cause corporations with the largest debt capacities have the lowest 
tax rates and capital costs and therefore attract disproportionately 
large amounts of capitaJ.I97 
The other two prototypes would reduce the tax benefits from 
leverage. However, because neither prototype would eliminate 
tax considerations from the capital structure decision, they would 
leave corporations with an incentive to balance reduced taxes 
against real costs. As a result, they would encourage waste and 
bias investment. 
The dividend exclusion prototype would reduce the biases 
caused by the interest deduction, but it would not eliminate them. 
Under the dividend exclusion prototype, interest income is taxed 
at the recipient's level, but dividends and retained earnings are 
taxed at the level of the corporate payor. With the dividend exclu-
sion prototype, corporations would have an incentive to issue debt 
as long as the effective corporate tax rate exceeds the tax rate of 
the marginal investor. However, as the corporation issues more 
debt, the effective tax rate will decline as the probability increases 
that the corporation will not be able to use all of its interest deduc-
tions currently. When the effective corporate and marginal inves-
197. An additional advantage to CBIT is that it reduces the bias against risk-
taking from incomplete-loss offsets because eliminating the dividend deduction 
reduces the likelihood that a corporation will have suspended losses. 
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tor's tax rates are equal, the tax advantage from debt disappears, 
and thereafter, there is a tax disadvantage from issuing more 
debt. 198 
The third prototype, shareholder allocation, is probably the 
most effective of the three prototypes studied by the Treasury af-
ter CBIT in eliminating the biases caused by the corporate interest 
deduction. 199 The shareholder allocation prototype requires each 
investor to include in income the investor's share of the corpora-
tion's pre-tax income after deducting interest payments made by 
the corporation and provides the investor a credit for the tax paid 
by the corporation. If the investor's tax rate exceeds the corpora-
tion's tax rate, the investor owes additional tax. If, however, the 
investor's tax rate is below the corporation's tax rate, the investor 
can use the excess credits to reduce its federal income tax bill. 
By treating the corporation as a conduit, the tax benefits of 
financial structure are largely eliminated. 200 Even so, the pro-
posed shareholder allocation prototype does not eliminate taxes 
from the capital structure decision. This is a result of maintaining 
the corporate interest deduction and incomplete-loss offsets com-
bined with no provision for passing losses through to investors. 
The effect of these provisions is to discourage corporations from 
issuing debt because the marginal value of the tax shield decreases 
with leverage. Thus, if debt can reduce agency costs, the corpora-
tion will have to pay a tax penalty for issuing debt.201 
198. Corporations are more likely to have negative income with the divi-
dend exclusion prototype than with CBIT. Thus, the dividend exclusion proto-
type does not reduce the bias apinst risk introduced by incomplete-loss offsets. 
199. With the exception that investors include within income only that por-
tion of the corporation's pre-tax income that is distributed as a dividend, the 
following comments about the shareholder allocation prototype also apply to the 
shareholder credit prototype recommended by the American Law Institute. 
200. One advantage of the shareholder allocation prototype over the divi-
dend exclusion prototype is that the shareholder allocation prototype eliminates 
the tax law's tendency to produce a clientele effect for bonds and stocks. 
20 I. An example will help to illustrate this point. Assume there is a single 
investor and that both the investor and the corporation are taxed at 80%. If the 
corporation has income of $100 before the interest deduction, the investor 
should have an after-tax gain of $70. However, when the interest paid is greater 
than $100, it causes the investor's net gain to be less than $70. Assume the cor-
poration paid $150 in interest. After the interest deduction, the corporation will 
have a $50 loss and thus no tax liability. The investor will pay $45 in taxes on his 
interest income of$150,leaving him with $105. However, the $50 loss does not 
pass through to the investor to offset other income. Therefore, the investor suf-
fers a $50 loss in the value of his equity without receiving a corresponding tax 
benefit. The investor's $105 gain, coupled with the $50 loss in equity, results in 
the investor having only a $55 net gain. A tax penalty of $15 has been incurred 
for paying more that $100 in interest. 
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D. Other Potential Solutions 
. The tax code's favorable treatment of debt over equity biases 
mvestment and hampers economic growth. There are several tax 
reform propos~s under consideration that proponents claim 
would stimulate mvestment and growth. These include the invest-
ment tax credit (lTC), the R&D tax credit and a reduction in the 
capital gains tax rate. In this section, I argue that none of these 
reforms would eliminate the identified bias. 
I. lTC and RfSD Tax Credit 
One possible method of overcoming the biases against 
growth and risk-taking is to adopt either or both an lTC and R&D 
tax credit. Although there might be reasons for having such cred-
its within the corporate tax, they cannot justify retaining the cor-
porate interest deduction. There are two reasons for this. First, 
the overlap between the activities discouraged by the corporate 
interest deduction and those encouraged by the two credits is im-
perfect. If the overlap is weak, then the bias will not be remedied. 
Second, the tax credits would not eliminate the excess financial 
distress costs because the corporate interest deduction encour-
ages corporations to increase their proportional leverage. 2o2 
2. Capital Gains Reduction 
Capital gains reduction has become a partisan political issue. 
Proponents, including the Reagan and Bush administrations, ar-
gue that a capital gains reduction would increase investment. Op-
ponents argue that it will do litde to increase investment but much 
to reduce taxes on the wealthy. Whatever the merits of these two 
conflicting positions, the only effect of a capital gains reduction 
that is of consequence to my thesis is its effect on the relative ef-
fective total tax rates of debt and equity. Because capital gains 
account for a larger share of equity's total gain than of debt's total 
gain, a capital gains reduction would lower the effective total tax 
rate on equity relative to that on debt. This would reduce the bias 
towards debt, thereby reducing the magnitude of the distortion. 205 
However, it would not eliminate the bias, even if the capital gains 
rate were reduced to zero, because the effective tax rate on equity 
would still exceed the effective tax rate on debt. 
202. Stt grnmdly THE R8cD TAX CuDrr: IssuEs IN TAX Poucv AND INDus-
TRW. INNOVAnoN (Kenneth M. Browned., 1984) (discussing R&:D tax credit, in-
cluding survey of research findings). 
20!1. I am indebted to my colleague, Alex Capron, for this observation. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Because current tax law allows corporations to deduct interest 
but not dividends and retained earnings, debt financing is taxed 
more favorably than is equity financing. Thus~ the existing tax law 
encourages corporations to increase leverage. However, not all 
corporations can increase leverage as easily. Because high-risk, 
high-growth projects employing intangible assets cannot support 
as much leverage as can low-risk, low-growth projects employing 
tangible assets, the existing corporate tax law discourages invest-
ment in the former in favor of investment in the latter. This misal-
locates capital within the corporate sector and discourages 
investment in precisely those industries and activities that many 
commentators consider to be critical to the economic future of the 
United States. 
